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ABSTRACT

The ever-increasing speed of information systems allows decision-makers around
the world to gather, process, and disseminate information almost instantaneously.
However, with this benefit there comes a price. Information is valuable and therefore a
target to those who do not have it or wish to destroy it. The Internet has allowed
information to flow freely, but it has also made information vulnerable to many forms of
corruption. The U. S. military controls much of the world's most sensitive information,
and since it cannot sacrifice losing the speed at which this information is currently
processed and disseminated, it must find a way to assure its protection. There has been
some effort to model information assurance in recent years, however the no accepted
quantifiable model currently exists.
This study presents a strategy to aid organizations, specifically organizations
within the Department of Defense (DoD), in their efforts to protect valuable information
and information systems. The model is reviewed and results from an actual analysis are
presented.

xiv

MODELING INFORMATION ASSURANCE

/. Introduction

1.1 Background
Like many great technological advances, the unprecedented growth of the Internet
has spawned new businesses, opportunities, ideas, and unfortunately, new problems. The
Internet created a global community that knows no geographic boundaries; the ability to
send and receive information freely and instantaneously has radically and permanently
changed the speed at which the world operates. Decision-makers can now gather,
process, and distribute information virtually instantaneously. This decision making
process is used worldwide in endeavors ranging from small family businesses to national
governments and transnational organizations. However, this free flow of information
across communication networks also produces a major vulnerability inherent to the
Internet. No nation or group is more exposed than the United States and its military.
Although the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) was responsible for creating the
predecessor to today's Internet, it was not originally designed to transfer information
critical to U. S. national security, nor was it built for access by untrustworthy users. This
thesis proposes a strategy to aid organizations, specifically organizations within the
Department of Defense, in their efforts to protect valuable information and information
systems.

The beginnings of the Internet trace back to the late 1950's when then President
Dwight D. Eisenhower formed the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in
response to the Soviet satellite launching of Sputnik [Gromov, 2000]. In 1962, ARPA
researcher Dr. J. C. R. Licklider was chosen to head the Information Processing
Techniques Office, a division focused solely on developing and improving the military's
computer technology [Zakon, 2000]. Work soon began on ARPANET, a computer
network designed to facilitate communication between several universities involved in
the project. ARPANET was finally operational in September of 1969 when researchers
of the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) successfully, although briefly,
logged into Stanford Research Institute (SRI) computers [Gromov, 2000].
ARPANET and other computer communication networks like it continued to
evolve throughout the 1970's and early 1980's. In 1982, DARPA, (formerly ARPA,
renamed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in 1972) in cooperation with
the Defense Communications Agency (DCA, now the Defense Information Systems
Agency, DISA), established the first Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
(TCP / IP) connection. This event is officially recognized as the beginning of the Internet
as it is known today [Zakon, 2000].
Security problems began almost immediately after the creation of the Internet.
Within two years, the Internet was experiencing 1,000 host breaks a year; by 1987 this
number had grown to 10,000 [Zakon, 2000]. The Internet, built from ARPANET'S
policy of openness and flexibility, was simply not designed for the security necessary to
perform commercial and governmental demands [Longstaff, Ellis, Hernan, Lipson,

McMillan, Pesante, and Simmel, 1997]. A new vulnerability in the United States and its
military had been exposed.
The U. S. military must make rapid, informed decisions in order to remain the
strongest force in the world. Networked computer systems that can gather, process, and
disseminate information quickly in order to "serve the Department of Defense's local,
national, and worldwide information needs" are necessary to accomplish this task [AFDD
2-5,1998: 4]. Interrupting, destroying, or otherwise corrupting this information causes
the decision making process to slow, which in turn reduces the ability of the military to
defend the country and creates an opportunity for valuable information to be corrupted,
lost, or stolen. The advent of computers and the Internet has created a new type of
warfare where information, information systems, and information processes, rather than
weapons or structures, are the targets. The results of a successful attack on a sensitive
government system could be devastating to national security.
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1: Air Force Basic Doctrine (September,
1997), the fundamental doctrine document for the U. S. Air Force, states that
Warfare is normally associated with the different mediums of land, sea,
air, and space. In addition, information is now considered another
medium in which some aspects of warfare can be conducted [AFDD 1,
1991:7].
The United States is more vulnerable to an information attack than any other nation due
to an array of political and military factors. The U. S. is the only true superpower that
exists today, making it a natural target for countries that wish to overtake that role or who
simply want to do harm. However, few countries, if any, will realistically want to face
the United States in a classic war. A well-planned information attack against the U. S.

may mitigate some of the nation's battlefield advantage, if even temporarily, making the
United States vulnerable to other conventional and unconventional attacks. The
asymmetric nature of an information attack, coupled with its stealth capabilities, make it
an ideal weapon for a nation state, national group, or transnational organization to use
against a military superpower.
Unlike a traditional attack, a potentially crippling information attack can come
from anyone at any time. If executed correctly, a single person could launch an
information attack powerful enough to severely cripple many sectors of the American
infrastructure. A small team of people could do even more damage in a shorter amount
of time. Often an attack may not even be detected until it is well in progress or
completed; this makes even determining who is attacking quite difficult. Information
itself can also be a target; classified material concerning U. S. war plans, technology, and
even personnel can provide the enemy with critical information that could compromise
national safety.
No system in operational use will ever be completely safe from attack; however,
the more that is known about an organization's system vulnerabilities, the better prepared
that organization will be should an attack come. If system vulnerabilities can be
identified before an enemy is able to exploit them, then the necessary steps to mitigate
these problems can be taken. The goal of this study is, therefore, to develop a model to
measure the level of information assurance (IA) for a DoD organization's information
system. Joint Doctrine defines information assurance as:
Information Operations (10) that protect and defend information systems
(IS) by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality,
and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information

systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities
[JP 3-13, 1998:1-9].
The difficulty in increasing IA lies in the balance between the level of IA and its
impact on system operational capability and resource costs [Hamill, 2000: 4-1].
Whenever system IA is increased, the operational capability for that system is potentially
impacted. Increasing IA to a maximum attainable level, which would secure the system
but render it operationally useless, would be no better (and perhaps worse) than not
securing it all. The solution to assuring a system is finding a balance between the level of
IA and its impact on system operational capability that falls somewhere between the
extremes of making a system so secure that it becomes ineffective, or so insecure that it
becomes an easy target. Since different systems contain different information, where the
balance point falls between these extremes will depend on the system itself.
In addition to impacting system operational capability, every IA strategy
consumes a certain amount of the organization's resources. A resource cost is defined to
be any cost associated with implementing an IA strategy, whether it is a fiscal cost or a
personnel cost. An information assurance strategy that greatly improves IA and system
operational capability that is too expensive will not be implemented, and is consequently
not helpful to the organization. Therefore, in order to obtain a true IA measure, the level
of IA gained by a strategy, the potential impact the strategy will have on system
operational capability, and cost of such an implementation must all be considered.

1.2 Problem Statement
Every military and civilian organization is susceptible to information attacks in a
variety of forms. It is therefore necessary to develop a methodology for measuring how

assured an organization is against an information compromise, and to provide that
organization with insight as to how they can improve their level of assurance. However,
resource costs and system operational capability may be impacted whenever an assurance
strategy is implemented and therefore must also be considered in the model.
This thesis utilized three separate hierarchical models that measure the total level
of information assurance as a tradeoff between IA, the change in system operational
capability incurred by the IA strategy, and the resource cost of implementing the strategy.
The models and their associated measures then aid in identifying what information
assurance strategies, if any, would be most beneficial.

1.3 Information System under Study
Several Air Force organizations were contacted regarding participation in this
study. After reviewing a range of systems, the kind offer of the Air Force Technical
Applications Center (AFTAC) was accepted. AFTAC, located at Patrick AFB, FL,
agreed to undertake this 'challenge' and volunteered their AFTAC Mission Information
System (AMIS) to be studied. The sole criterion for selecting a system was that it
contain valuable information the organization needed to protect. AMIS satisfied this
condition as it is classified a SECRET system. AFTAC personnel served as the system's
experts to help create value hierarchies, single dimensional measure functions, and score
their system and a set of possible IA options. Their willingness to take on this extra duty
is greatly appreciated. This project could not have been completed without their
dedicated efforts.

1.4 Importance of Project
The number of computer security incidents has been steadily increasing over the
past decade. As the Internet grows, so does the likelihood of an unauthorized system
penetration. In December 1988, DARPA (the same organization responsible for building
the ARPANET and then the Internet, detailed above) formed the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT) in reaction to an Internet virus known as the "Morris Worm,"
which brought down nearly 10% of the entire Internet at the time [CERT/CC, 2000].
Since 1988, the team has evolved into the CERT Coordination Center and is responsible
for reporting major security incidents over the Internet. Figure 1-1, taken from data on
the CERT Web site, shows the number of incidents identified snA subsequently reported
to CERT since 1988:
CERT Incidents Reported 1988-2000
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Figure 1-1: CERT Statistics on Incidents per Year [CERT/CC, 2001].

This chart represents only the incidents actually reported to CERT, which
suggests that there may be thousands more incidents that go either undetected or

unreported. Any one of the thousands of incidents portrayed above has the potential to
do severe damage to the U. S. military, U. S. national infrastructure, or private business.
Notice that of the 47,708 total incidents reported to CERT from 1988-2000,21,756
(approximately 45.6%) occurred in year 2000 alone. If the number of incidents continues
to rise at this rate, a disaster is inevitable. Information assurance is the first step in
preventing such a disaster.
The Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT), established in
1992, is the AF equivalent to CERT. The mission of AFCERT is to "conduct operations
involving intrusion detection, incident response, computer security information
assistance, and vulnerability assessment of Air Force automated information systems"
[AFCERT, 2001]. AFCERT also records information detailing the number of system
incidents reported by Air Force organizations. Figure 1-2 is an inverted pyramid chart
showing incident classifications for the year 1999:
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Figure 1-2: 1999 AFCERT Analysis

Approximately 368 million events out of some 5 to 7 billion events were classified as
suspicious connections. Each of these suspicious connections had to be analyzed, and
further action was taken on those that necessitated it. Buried in the 368 million
suspicious connections were 71 incidents that AFCERT determined to be of malicious
intent to the Air Force. While five of these incidents proved to be false positives, any one
of the remaining 66 incidents had the potential to severely damage U. S. national
security.
Currently there are very few available methods that would allow organizations to
measure the level of IA in a given system. While all organizations strive to protect their
resources as best they can, there is no universally accepted way to quantitatively
determine exactly what level of assurance they have, nor what new IA technologies will
best help them improve their assurance level. This thesis presents an organization with a
specific model that provides valuable insight as to the best way to improve their
information assurance and at what cost.

1.5 Research Approach
As previously mentioned, the problem has three objectives: measure and
potentially increase the level of IA at AFTAC while accounting for the impact of the IA
strategy on system operational capability and resource costs. Since each organization
will value IA, resource costs, and system operational capability differently, one universal
best-case solution for this problem may not be desirable. Depending on how
organizations value each of the objectives, it is very possible that ten organizations can
have ten different solutions, all equally valid for their specific mission objectives. The

project is therefore tailored to AFTAC's AMIS system using an approach known as
Value Focused Thinking (VFT). However, application of the basic model and
methodology to other organizations and systems is possible and encouraged.
VFT focuses on the values of the decision-maker rather than a proposed set of
alternatives. A value hierarchy is created to represent what the decision-maker feels is
important to the project. A measure is developed to represent each value; these values
are then weighted by the decision-maker based upon the range of the measure. It is this
weighting process that allows a general model to be tailored to a specific commander or
organization. Different alternatives, including the current state of the system, are then
scored and ranked, producing a measure of best alternatives derived directly from the
decision-maker's values.

1.6 Thesis Overview and Format
A literature review of military information assurance doctrine, computer security
in the public sector, past attempts at modeling I A, and a review of VFT theory will follow
in Chapter 2. A description of the methodology used to accomplish the research in this
study and the creation of the value hierarchies will be detailed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4
presents the results of the analysis, including strategy rankings based on the decisionmaker's value weights. A sensitivity analysis on the hierarchy weights is also presented
in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 will be a discussion on the conclusions drawn from the
study and potential opportunities for future work. The Appendix is a detailed summary
of the values within the hierarchy and their associated measure functions developed in
cooperation with AFTAC and the selected information system.
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2. Literature Review

This chapter focuses on previous work in the field of Information Assurance (IA)
and Value Focused Thinking (VFT). A review of Department of Defense (DoD) doctrine
and civilian industry standards provides the scope needed to show the importance of IA
in today's environment and to provide the foundation for the models developed. The
doctrine review is followed by a detailed discussion of Value Focused Thinking, which
will provide the framework used to attack the problem of modeling information
assurance. Finally, past and present work on IA models will be presented in order to gain
fundamental insight on modeling techniques that have been successful.

2.1 Department of Defense Doctrine
To effectively measure information assurance in military organizations it is
essential that the elements of IA the DoD feels are important be correctly captured within
the model. Therefore published DoD doctrine, which is the official position of the U. S.
Government, was used as expert sources.
Information operations have become one of the most important issues in defense
doctrine. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5: Information Operations states that
"dominating the information spectrum is as critical to conflict now as controlling air and
space, or occupying land was in the past, and is viewed as an indispensable and
synergistic component of aerospace power" [AFDD 2-5,1998: 5].
While doctrine on IA does exist, it is still a relatively new and developing field.
There are several ways IA is defined, however the definition given in Chapter 1 from

11

Joint Publication 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations will be the definition
used throughout the study:
Information assurance is defined as Information Operations (10) that
protect and defend information systems by ensuring their availability,
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes
providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities [JP 3-13,1998:1-9].
The terms availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation are
considered objectives of information assurance and are defined by JP 3-13 in the context
ofIA in Table 2-1:
Table 2-1: Definitions of Information Assurance Objectives [JP 3-13 1998: III-3]

Definitions of IA Objectives
Assured access by authorized users
Availability
Integrity
Protection from unauthorized change
Verification of the originator
Authentication
Protection from unauthorized disclosure
Confidentiality
Non-Repudiation Undeniable proof of participation

Information Operations is a broad term defined by Joint Doctrine as follows:
actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems
while defending one's own information and information systems. 10
apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations,
and at every level of war [JP 3-13,1998:1-1].
Information assurance therefore is a subcategory of information operations; specifically,
IA covers the defensive realm of information operations. Figure 2-1, taken from JP 3-13,
illustrates the role of information assurance in the information operations spectrum:
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Information Operations
Relationships Across the Peace-Conflict Cycle

Peace

-► Crisis

Conflict

-► Return to Peace

Figure 2-1: Information Operations Spectrum [JP 3-13, 1998:1-4]
Figure 2-1 shows IA as a continuous process; it covers the entire range of
information operations from peacetime through a major conflict and back to peace. The
U. S. cannot afford to focus on the importance of IA only when a conflict arises; it
demands strict vigilance at all times. The U. S. is continuously vulnerable to an
information attack and therefore must always protect against one. An IA model must
capture all the elements of doctrine discussed above in a quantifiable manner so it can
determine if the organization under study meets these requirements, and if they do not
meet them, where they are most vulnerable. The model must also show the protection,
detection, and reaction capabilities of the organization under study.
Information assurance is therefore the continual process of system management
whereby:
1) Authorized users can access the system
2) Unauthorized users cannot access the system
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3) Information is not lost, stolen, or corrupted
4) Users and transmissions can be monitored
5) Intrusions can be detected
6) Actions can be taken during and after an intrusion
The above list is not meant to be an all-inclusive representation of information assurance,
but rather a starting point given by DoD doctrine that all organizations must adhere.

2.2 Protection, Detection, Reaction
Protection is the first line of defense in any system; if the enemy cannot penetrate
the system then information cannot be compromised. However, in order to protect
systems appropriately, detailed knowledge of the threats to the system must first be
obtained. Acquiring such knowledge is no easy task in today's volatile social and
political environment. A collection of potential threats that include terrorist groups,
computer hackers, and foreign nations are all equally capable of launching an information
attack. Speaking in terms of firepower alone, the United States military is perhaps the
strongest force the world has ever seen, yet it is more vulnerable now then ever to an
information operations attack. Information warfare is a potential "Achilles' heel' of the
United States [which] can be the great equalizer for a militarily inferior adversary"
[AFDD 2-5,1998:6].
The threat of an electronic attack against the United States is mainly due to the
free flow of information allowed by the Internet. Since almost anyone can gain access to
the Internet, the list of potential attackers is virtually limitless. Defending against all
these threats requires what the DoD calls information superiority, defined as "the
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capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same" [JP 3-13,1998:1-10]. Air
Force doctrine also provides an alternate definition for information superiority: "that
degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability
to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition" [AFDD
2-5,1998: 42]. Information superiority gives the U. S. the ability to control information
even on an insecure network such as the Internet. Since information superiority cannot
be obtained and maintained without information assurance, to control the information
operations (10) spectrum, the U. S. military must have the ability to protect its own
information, detect any unauthorized intrusions, and react to those intrusions in a timely
fashion.
Information assurance is contained under the Defensive Counterinformation
(DCI) subcategory of the Information Superiority hierarchy, shown as Figure 2-2. The
chart shows that defensive counterinformation and offensive counterinformation (OCI)
are interrelated, indicating that offensive 10 techniques must be used to gather
information from enemies while at the same time defending friendly information from
attack [AFDD 2-5,1998:3].
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Information Superiority
Information Operations
Information-in-Warfare
Exploit
ISR
Weather
Precision Navigation & Positioning
Other Information Collection /
Dissemination Activities

Information Warfare

Gain

Attack

Defend

Counterinformation
Offensive
Counterinformation

Defensive
Counterinformation

PSYOP
Electronic Warfare
Military Deception
Physical Attack
Information Attack

Information Assurance
OPSEC
Counter-intelligence
Counter-PSYOP
Electronic Protection
Counter-deception

Figure 2-2: Air Force Information Superiority Construct [AFDD 2-5, 1998: 3]

Offensive counterinformation is defined to be:
Actions taken to control the information environment. OCI operations
are designed to limit, degrade, disrupt, or destroy adversary information
capabilities and are dependent on having an understanding of an
adversary's information capabilities [AFDD 2-5,1998: 10].
Similarly, Air Force doctrine defines defensive counterinformation as:
Actions that protect information, information systems, and information
operations from any potential adversary. DCI includes such programs as
operations security (OPSEC), information assurance, and
counterintelligence [AFDD 2-5,1998: 10].
Information superiority requires that both OCI and DCI be performed equally well in
order to control the information environment; failure to do so will prevent the U. S.
military from controlling the information operations spectrum.
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2.3 INFOCON Levels
The threat of information warfare prompted the DoD to implement the
Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) system. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) Memo CM-510-00 describes INFOCON as:
A comprehensive defense posture and response based on the status of
information systems, military operations, and intelligence assessments of
adversary capabilities and intent. The INFOCON system presents a
structured, coordinated approach to defend against a computer network
attack and measures the focus on computer network-based protective
measures. Each level reflects a defensive posture based on the risk of
impact to military operations through the intentional disruption of friendly
information systems [CJCS Memorandum CM-510-00,1999].
Table 2-2 outlines the INFOCON levels as reported by AFTAC:
Table 2-2: INFOCON Levels
INFOCON Level
INFOCON
ALPHA
INFOCON
BRAVO
INFOCON
CHARLIE
INFOCON
DELTA

Threat Assessment
Indications and warnings of a general threat resulting from a
possible regional event, system probe, or planned exercise
Indications that specific system being targeted, detection of
significant and concentrated network reconnaissance, or network
penetration resulting in no impact on DoD operations.
Limited impact attacks detected or imminent, although attacks
are successfully counteracted and missions are still able to be
accomplished
General attack implying impact on DoD operations, loss in
system functionality, and significant risk of mission failure
[AFTAC, 2001].

U. S. military doctrine clearly shows the importance of IA and the role it will play
in the emerging information era. The capability to physically attack the United States is
limited; however the potential damage that can result from an information attack makes
U. S. information, information systems, and information processes prime targets. It is
easy to see that a compromise of sensitive U. S. information or data could lead to military
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disasters. Similarly, an attack on U. S. nationwide critical infrastructures could be of
equal or greater consequence.

2.4 Critical Infrastructure Assurance
Computers and technology have become so integrated in society that their
services are taken for granted. All key infrastructures in the United States are now
automated to some degree, making life move faster and somewhat easier for everyone.
However, the ability of technology to provide Americans with an easier life has also
created a major vulnerability. An information failure on a critical infrastructure system,
due to natural causes or malicious attack, could cripple the country. This criticality is so
important that in July of 1996 then President Clinton signed Executive Order 13010
establishing the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP),
which was tasked with "developing a comprehensive national policy and implementation
strategy for protecting critical infrastructures from physical and cyber threats"
[Information Assurance 1999: ES2]. Specifically, the PCCIP was tasked to look at the
five following infrastructure sectors:
1) Information and Communications
2) Banking and Finance
3) Energy, Including Electrical Power, Oil and Gas
4) Physical Distribution
5) Vital Human Services [PCCIP, 1997: 2].
Critical Infrastructures form the backbone of the country; they include such
entities as highways, water supplies, electric companies, and financial institutions. They
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exist to support the citizens of the U. S. and their economy. These infrastructures bring
citizens services they cannot provide for themselves. The PCCIP states:
The development of the computer and its astonishingly rapid
improvements have ushered in the Information Age that affects almost all
aspects of American commerce and society. Our security, economy, way
of life, and perhaps even survival, are now dependent on the interrelated
trio of electrical energy, communications, and computers [PCCIP, 1997:
3].
All infrastructures, military and civilian, are computer operated in one form or another
and thus susceptible to an information attack.
In the 1997 exercise ELIGIBLE RECEIVER, a covert simulated attack on the
nation's infrastructures ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proved that by using only
open source intelligence and widely available hacker tools that U. S. infrastructures were
quite vulnerable to malicious attack [Information Assurance 1999: ES3]. These finding
were proven to be true in 1998 when a group of U. S. teenagers and an Israeli mentor
were able to penetrate DoD logistics, finance, and personnel records in what came to be
known as the SOLAR SUNRISE intrusions [Information Assurance, 1999: ES3]. If a
group of U. S. teenagers were able to gain unauthorized access into these systems with
relative ease, then certainly a highly trained hostile force could enter these systems and
cause tremendous damage.
In response to ELIGIBLE RECEIVER and SOLAR SUNRISE, the White House
released Presidential Decision Directive 63 in May of 1998 which:
1) Established a national goal for infrastructure protection
2) Created a national structure much like that recommended by the
President's Commission
3) Provided guidelines on infrastructure protection
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4) Required each Federal department and agency to assign IA
responsibilities to the Chief Information Officer and appoint a Chief
Infrastructure Assurance Officer
5) Called for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan to address specific
tasks such as vulnerability analyses, warning, response, reconstitution,
etc. [Information Assurance, 1999: ES3].
A national plan similar to the DoD assurance objectives was called for to protect
critical infrastructures. Presidential Directive 63 made information assurance a national
concern, although it took a near disaster for this to occur. Private business also followed
suit after realizing that they were also targets for cyber attack.

2.5 Private Sector IA Concerns
The Internet created a brand new business market and communication medium for
people around the world to utilize. If a product exists, chances are it is available from the
Internet through either a retailer or a private individual. "With information from many
sources but a click away ... this globe-spanning network's ability to let us check and
compare prices for similar goods and services" generally offers the consumer a lower
cost than the neighborhood store [Harrow, 1998].
The Internet allows consumers the ability to search for and purchase goods
directly from their own home, making shopping more convenient and less expensive.
However, there are risks associated with purchasing goods via the Internet; personal
financial information, whether a valid credit card number, checking account, or other
data, is required. A faulty security system, even on a trusted site, could lead to
unauthorized persons fraudulently using stolen information to purchase on-line goods and
services.
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An experienced hacker or group of hackers could steal thousands of credit card
numbers a day if they are able to bypass a site's security system. One group of eleven
people, known as the "Phone Masters," accomplished such a feat by breaking into several
local and long distance telephone companies, credit reporting firms, and even the FBI's
Crime Information Center [Holzinger, 2000: 32]. The group stole consumer credit card
information and sold it worldwide. An estimated $1.1 to $1.5 million dollars was lost
due to "Phone Master" activities; FBI agent Michael Morris stated "They could have temporarily at least - crippled the nation's phone network.. .What scares me the most is
that [the Phone Masters gang] could have done a lot more damage" [Holzinger, 2000:
32].
In a recent survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers and Information Week magazine of
1,600 information security professionals in 50 countries, it was determined that on-line
businesses were found to be the most at risk group for Internet attacks. The survey found
that on-line businesses could expect three times the amount of attempted hacks to their
system compared to non-commerce sites, and they could lose up to seven times more
revenue due to these hacks [Holzinger, 2000: 33].
Many corporations, DoD organizations, and other interest groups use their World
Wide Web sites not for business but to help expand their influence or provide information
to users and subscribers. While these sites are not attacked for financial gain, they are
often attacked simply to prove it can be done or to protest some social or political point
of view. The chart from CERT, shown as Figure 1-1 in Chapter 1, illustrates the growing
trend of malicious Internet attacks.
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The widespread use of electronic mail (e-mail) has created another opportunity
for malicious attack on computer systems. In May of 2000, the "I Love You" computer
virus passed through an estimated 500,000 systems, crippling numerous sites by flooding
their email and erasing countless multimedia files [CERT: Advisory, 2000].
Another barrier in the search for universal IA concerns the legal ramifications of
the Internet. Currently, U. S. codes of law dictate that "concepts of jurisdiction are
principally based on notions of physical presence within a jurisdiction" [Donohue, 1997:
7]. However, a crime can be committed via the Internet from almost any location in the
world, which makes capturing and trying suspected Internet criminals very difficult.
There are three specific factors of the Internet that makes legal prosecution nearly
impossible:
Location of Machines: The Internet permits interaction between people
who do not know each other's physical locations, therefore they cannot
know the laws of the other's persons residence
Caching: The process where information to servers is copied on the user's
hard drive so that future trips to the same Web site will be less time
consuming. While caching is essential to the speed of operation, it
prevents the computer from distinguishing an original source from a
cache.
Hyperlink: Allows one Web site to connect to another, regardless of
location. One Web site may be in a certain legal jurisdiction, while the
other may not. A legal dilemma arises when the nonresident site posts
illegal subject matter (however defined in that jurisdiction) through the
resident site [Donohue, 1997: 7-8].
These legal issues concerning Internet crime are quite extensive and will not be
easily solved. What is legal in one area may not be legal in another area; therefore
determining when and where a crime took place can be extremely difficult. Even if a
location was identified as the source of the crime, determining the person behind the
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computer screen, and whether or not it was a state sponsored attack, can be an even
harder task.

2.6 Measures of Effectiveness and Past Models
The historical development and nature of the Internet makes securing it very
difficult. The Internet was created to allow information to flow freely between trusted
users. Today, it is increasingly difficult to determine exactly who has access to what
information. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Research Program on
Communication Policy realized that the original intent of the Internet must be preserved
when making security regulations. They outlined four principles that they feel need to be
adhered to with regard to information assurance:
1) Open Architecture: Policies that permit interconnection among
different telecommunications and information systems and services;
2) Open Access: Capacity for any subject to enter and compete in the
telecommunication and information markets;
3) Universal Access: Eliminate physical barriers that hamper general
access;
4) Flexible Access: Eliminate technical barriers that hamper general
access [Valeri, 2000: 133].
While all of these principles may not directly apply to military systems, they do illustrate
the tension between competing agendas.
Information assurance that degrades the operational capability of a system to the
point where it is no longer useful serves no advantage. The Internet has proved to be too
useful a tool to close it off to the world. It is important to keep as much information
readily available to the authorized users as possible; placing restrictive security measures
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across the Internet is not the desired solution. Some systems, however, need to remain
secure. It is therefore the goal of this study to provide a model where public information
remains accessible and sensitive information remains guarded.
The ever-growing number of security software manufactures prevents product
equality. Consumers can never be quite sure that the product they are purchasing is
actually doing what the software company claims it can. To combat this problem, the
National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) collaborated in 1997 to form the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP). The NIAP is a "U. S. Government initiative designed to meet the security
testing, evaluation, and assessment needs of both information technology (IT) producers
and consumers" [NAIP: About, 2001]. The NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme for IT Security is a program that specifically "helps consumers select
commercial off-the-shelf IT products that meet their security requirements and to help
manufacturers of those products gain acceptance in the global marketplace" [NAIP:
Introduction, 1999]. Forcing software manufacturers to produce quality, secure
information technologies on a consistent basis will reduce the number of competitors
selling unsatisfactory products.

2.7 Value Focused Thinking
Every organization is different and therefore will have a different perspective on
IA, and the impact of IA on its system operational capability and resource costs.
Organizations that hold very sensitive information will tend to choose aggressive IA
strategies potentially sacrificing operational capability. Likewise, organizations that
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value the use of the system more than controlling the access and integrity of the
information contained in the system will tend to choose IA strategies that minimally
impact their operational capability. This is the viewpoint that Value Focused Thinking
(VFT) takes in the study, where the values of the decision-maker(s) are captured and
consequently pursued, rather than having the decision-maker choose between
predetermined lists of alternatives. R. L. Keeney, pioneer of VFT, states, "values are
what we fundamentally care about in decision-making. Alternatives are simply means to
achieve our values" [Keeney, 1994: 793].
Perhaps the most import element of the decision-making process is to follow a
scientific method that will lead to the desired results. The following simple, yet
extremely important steps should be followed when making an important and difficult
decision:
1) Specify objectives and scales for measuring achievement with respect
to those objectives
2) Develop alternatives that potentially might achieve the objective
3) Determine how well each alternative achieves each objective
4) Consider tradeoffs among the objectives
5) Select the alternative that, on balance, best achieves the objectives,
taking into account uncertainties [Kirkwood, 1997: 3].
2.7.1 Value Hierarchies
The first step in VFT is to develop a value hierarchy based upon what the
decision-maker feels is important to the success of the decision. All value hierarchies
must be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive [Kirkwood 1997: 17]. Mutual
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exclusivity in a value hierarchy means that each specific value is only counted once. This
prevents a value from being over represented because it is inappropriately counted more
than one time. Collectively exhaustive signifies that all the key values of the decisionmaker are contained within the model. Failing to represent a value could lead to a
decision inconsistent with the decision-maker's true values.
A prototype IA value hierarchy developed by Captain Todd Hamill, USAF,
depicted as Figure 2-3 (measures not shown), will be used to illustrate the VFT process
from beginning to end. This thesis builds upon Hamill's work and therefore it is
beneficial to introduce VFT using his hierarchies as opposed to a notional example.
Information Assurance

I

Information & IS Protection

Detection

Reaction
Timely

Respond

Defense in Depth
Cyber Attacks

Properly Focused

Compliance

Flexible Deterrence

— Physical Attacks
Availability (System Resiliency)

■— Inter-Personal Attacks

Restore (Information & IS)

Confidentiality
Reliable

Timely

Integrity
Cyber Attacks

Accurately

Physical Attacks

Improved State

Inter-Personal Attacks

Figure 2-3: Hamill's IA Value Hierarchy [Hamill, 2000: 4-3]

In Hamill's IA hierarchy, the decision-maker's fundamental values in relation to
information assurance are Information & Information Systems (IS) Protection, Detection,
and Reaction. Since it was determined that Information & Information Systems (IS)
Protection, Detection, and Reaction could not be directly measured, they were
decomposed until single dimensional, measurable values were obtained. Together, the
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hierarchy is collectively exhaustive since it captures every key value associated with
information assurance (according to this specific decision-maker), and mutually exclusive
since no two values are the same.
2.7.2 Value Measures
Once the value hierarchy is established, the decision-maker and analyst again
work to establish single dimensional value functions to quantifiably measure each value
within the hierarchy. The measure functions are set so that the best possible outcome
scores a 1.0 and the worst possible outcome scores a 0.0 [Kirkwood, 1997: 68]. All other
outcomes fall somewhere between 0.0 and 1.0. The relationships of the measure
functions are required to be either monotonically increasing or decreasing over the range
of the value.
Consider the value Integrity found under the Information & Information Systems
(IS) Protection column of HamilPs IA hierarchy. In order to determine if a system has
integrity, it must be able to be measured. Hamill further decomposed Integrity into Data
Integrity and System Integrity. Figure 2-4 illustrates the two measure functions for the
value Integrity:
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Figure 2-4: Data Integrity Measure [Hamill, 2000: A-34] and System Integrity Measure [Hamill, 2000: A-36]

Measure functions may be categorical, discrete, piecewise linear, or continuous so long
as they are monotonic and have non-negative values [Kirkwood, 1997:64-65]. In this
example, the value ranges from 0.0 to 10.0, although this may be arbitrary so long as they
are consistent. The finalized single dimensional measure functions built in this study and
presented in Chapter 3 are on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0.
The exponential mathematical function is used to approximate continuous
functions, where p (the Greek letter "rho") represents the exponential constant. The
exponential single dimensional value function for monotonically increasing preferences,
such as shown in the System Integrity graph in Figure 2-4, is given as Equation 2-1:
1 - exp[- (x - Low) I p]
,p*co
1 - exp[-(High - Low) I p]
v(x)=
x - Low
, otherwise
High - Low
Equation 2-1: Monotonically Increasing Exponential Single Dimensional Value Function [Kirkwood, 1997: 65]

The exponential single dimensional value function for monotonically decreasing
preferences is given as Equation 2-2:

28

vW =

1 - exp[- (High - x) I p]
,P* 00
1 - exp[-(High - Low) I p]
High - x
,otherwise
High - Low

Equation 2-2: Monotonically Decreasing Exponential Single Dimensional Value Function [Kirkwood, 1997: 66]

The value of/? is determined by measure function's curve. Measures with a large curve
will have lower p values, and measures with flatter curves will have high p values. A
perfectly straight line will have a p of infinity [Kirkwood, 1997: 65]. Figure 2-5 shows
examples of increasing and decreasing exponential single dimensional value functions as
p is varied:
Decreasing Preferences

Increasing Preferences

2

3

4

5

6

7
Evaluation Measure (Score)

Evaluation Measure (Score)

Figure 2-5: Exponential Single Dimensional Value Function Examples [Kirkwood, 1997: 65].

The continuous functions used in this project were approximated using the above
equations implemented in a Microsoft Excel © spreadsheet program.
2.7.3 Swing Weighting
Based on the ranges of these functions (its least preferred value to its most
preferred value), the decision-maker must weight each measure within the value with
respect to all others, then each value within the column, and finally each column within
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the hierarchy [Kirkwood, 1997: 70]. This establishes a local and a global weight for each
value; the local weight is used to measure the importance of the value within the column,
and the global weight determines the degree of impact the value will have on an
alternative's final value score.
Swing weighting is a technique whereby the "weight for an evaluation measure is
equal to the increment in value that is received from moving the score on that evaluation
measure from its least preferred level to its most preferred level" [Kirkwood, 1997: 68].
In the example from Hamill's hierarchy, the decision-maker would determine if a change
from no Data Integrity (value 0.0) to automated-full Data Integrity (value 1.0) was more
or less valuable than a change from 0% System Integrity (value 0.0) to 100% System
Integrity (value 1.0). The relative importance of the value increments are compared, and
whichever is greater will be weighted accordingly. This technique of comparison
weighting, which ultimately produces ratios of relative importance within each tier of the
hierarchy, provides a more accurate representation of the decision-maker's true value
preferences then weighting without comparison.
For example, suppose the decision-maker determined that the value increment
gained by going from 0% System Integrity to 100% System Integrity was three times as
important as the value gained by going from no Data Integrity to automated-full Data
Integrity. The System Integrity measure would therefore be weighted three times the
Data Integrity measure, which on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0, would result in 0.75 and 0.25
respectively. This process would be continued in order to weight Integrity against the
other values in the Information and IS Protection column, and then to weight Information
and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction against themselves.

30

It is essential to remember that the ranges on each measure are the most important
factor when determining weights. Generally, the weight of the value will decrease as the
range of the value decreases. Suppose a company executive wants to purchase an
automobile, and for simplicity's sake, bases his choice of cars on two values: cost and
color. Assume that the decision to buy has been made and will not change. When asked
to weight these values with respect to each other, most decision-makers would
immediately weight cost much higher than color because they believe cost will always be
more important. However, if the decision-maker were told that all the cars ranged on
cost from $15,000 to $15,100 (a mere $100 difference) then that person may very well
weight color above cost since the relative range on cost was so small the decision-maker
became essentially indifferent towards the alternatives (with respect to cost). If two cars
cost about the same, then the executive would buy the one that came in the color he liked
most. Swing weighting captures these scale differences and allows the decision-maker to
weight values based on the decision, and not on past prejudices.
2.7.4 Alternative Overall Value Score
After measure functions have been created for each value and assigned their
appropriate weight, as determined by decision-maker preferences, strategies can then
receive their final overall value score. An alternative's overall value score is calculated
by multiplying the global weight of each measure by its respective specific measure value
summed across all measures. Equation 2-3 shows this relationship mathematically:

31

n
1=1
Equation 2-3: Additive Value Function
Where:
•

2J /I;

•

«is the number of objectives (or the number of single dimensional value
functions);
X\ is the global weight for the ith objective;
Vj(Xj) is the value of the alternative with respect to the i objective; and,
v(x) is the overall value of an alternative [Hamill, 2000: 2-31].

•
•
•

= 1 is the requirement for normalization;

2.7.5 Alternative Rankings
The next step of the VFT process after creating and properly weighting the value
hierarchy is to determine a Baseline Case to which all other alternatives may be
compared. While not necessary in all VFT studies, it was determined that baselining the
current system would help to identify value gaps, which are defined to be weaknesses in
critical areas in the current operating system. Alternatives can then be tailored to address
these value gaps. This is the essence of VFT - creating decision alternatives that address
the decision-maker's values. The decision-maker is not forced to choose from a
predetermined set of alternatives; they now have the ability to create their own solution
guided by their explicitly elicited values. The alternatives are scored based upon
measures created to represent each value. Again, every value must have at least one
measure so that an alternative may receive a score in that value. The alternative that
obtains the highest combined score from Equation 2-3 is therefore the best alternative
because it addresses the decision-maker's values better than any other did. If this is not
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the case, a review of the hierarchy may very well disclose previously unrevealed or
missing values and objectives.
A sensitivity analysis can be done on each value weight to see if there is a point
where the alternatives will change their rank order. This becomes an important part of
the analysis if there are any concerns regarding hierarchy weighting. If the hierarchy is
found to be very sensitive, then further analysis may be needed to make certain the
weights are correct. Sensitive weights are ones that will reorder alternative rankings if
changed within the anticipated possible range of variation. Conversely, insensitive
weights are not likely to change the alternatives' rankings, mitigating any concern
regarding that particular weight.
Value Focused Thinking was chosen in this study because virtually any properly
constructed model can, with care, be fine-tuned and applied to many different
organizations. Information assurance is important to every DoD agency and to the
civilian sector as well. Assisting decision-makers in improving IA is an essential analysis
tool. Decision-makers will value the objectives in the hierarchies differently depending
on their particular circumstance; the weighting process allows this differentiation to
occur. VFT provides a platform to develop a model that is general enough to be used
across a wide spectrum of organizations, yet can be specifically tailored to meet each
individual organization's unique mission.

2.8 Past Models
This thesis builds upon previous work presented in a March 2000 Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) Master's Thesis effort by Captain Todd Hamill, USAF.
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It is a premise of this study that measures of effectiveness be developed in order to
quantify the level of IA for a specified organization. Once the organization's current
state of IA is determined, different alternatives are then analyzed to show where the most
improvement could be gained. However, improving IA impacts system operational
capability and resource costs, so it is also necessary to model these elements. The three
separate models were used together to analyze AFTAC, as mentioned in Chapter 1.
AFTAC is able to see the value that each alternative had with respect to each model,
which allows them to have the opportunity to make a final decision as to what, if any,
changes they needed to make to their system.
Hamill's information assurance hierarchy originated from the doctrine discussed
in previous sections, past AFIT models, and IA experts. The first attempt to model
information assurance at AFIT can be found in Captain Michael P. Doyle's et al "A Value
Function Approach to Information Operations MOE's: A Preliminary Study." Doyle's
hierarchy is shown as Figure 2-6.
Although the hierarchy is entitled Defensive Information Operations (10) and not
Information Assurance, the top tier of the hierarchy was derived from the JP 3-13
definition of IA, which again states that IA must include measures taken to restore
"information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities"
[JP 3-13,1998:1-9]. The hierarchy separates Reaction into Capability Restoration and
10 Attack Response.
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Figure 2-6: Defensive 10 [Doyle, Deckro, Jackson, and Kloeber, 1997: 36, JP 3-13, 1998]

Hamill built upon Doyle's research with emphasis on making a model that could
be used by a variety of different organizations. Realizing that IA would likely impact the
system operational capability and consume resources, Hamill created three separate value
hierarchies: Information Assurance, Operational Capability, and Resource Costs.
Hamill's hierarchies were used as a starting point to model information assurance at
AFTAC, the organization chosen for this study. Figure 2-7 is Hamill's complete IA
Value Hierarchy; values are shown in the boxes, with their respective measure functions
shown as ovals.
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System Integrity"""^}

Figure 2-7: Hamill's Information Assurance Value Hierarchy [Hamill, 2000: A-64]

Hamill developed separate models for operational capability and the resource costs of
implementing a new IA strategy since information assurance would likely impact them.
Figure 2-8 and Figure 2-9 present these value hierarchies along with their associated
measures:
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Figure 2-8: Hamill's Operational Capability Value Hierarchy [Hamill, 2000: 4-13]

Resource Costs
X
Finite-Resource
Consumption

Fiscal Resources

^Workforce J)

Figure 2-9: Hamill's Resource Costs Value Hierarchy [Hamill, 2000: 4-17]
It is important to note that Hamill's hierarchies were used to aid AFTAC
personnel as a starting point in determining how they value information assurance. The
hierarchies were not presented as the single, correct manner in which to model
information assurance; Chapter 3 will show that the final hierarchies changed
significantly. The conceptual models developed by Hamill afford a baseline which,
coupled with this study, provides a guide to tailor an IA analysis to a specific
organization and system.
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2.9 Methodology
This chapter presented a literature review detailing why information assurance is
important and some previous attempts to measure it. Chapter 2 also presented a solid
theoretical and practical basis for the methodology used to model information assurance
at AFTAC, which will be discussed in the following chapter.
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3. Methodology

The previous two chapters detailed the importance of Information Assurance and
the benefits of developing a quantitative model of IA. However, the models reviewed in
Chapter 2 have not been fully tested on operational systems that contain sensitive
information. The primary objective of this research was to build on past models, Joint
Doctrine, and area experts to develop an IA model that would be applied to an
operational system. HamiU's work and joint doctrine provided a solid starting point;
however it was not until the values and expertise of IA personnel were captured that the
prototype model was fine tuned for a specific operating system. This chapter focuses on
the process used to analyze information assurance at AFTAC.

3.1 Model Development
Value Focused Thinking (VFT) was used to develop an Information Assurance
Analysis Model. It was determined that measuring the level of IA alone was not
sufficient since any IA modifications to a system are highly likely to impact the
capability of the system, and the modifications generally cost the organization some
amount of resources. The main goal of this thesis is to provide a model that will assist
organizations in making IA decisions. In order to accomplish that goal, the entire
decision to implement an IA strategy, to include the level of assurance attained, the
resource costs consumed by the strategy, and the effects on system operational capability
must be considered.
An IA strategy is defined to be either a physical upgrade (hardware, software, or
physical security), a change in policy with the intent of improving information assurance,
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or some combination of the two. The best IA strategies will increase information
assurance, increase the system operational capability, and can to be implemented at a low
cost to the organization. Figure 3-1 portrays the relationship between Information
Assurance (IA), the Impact of Information Assurance on Operational Capability (IOC),
and the Impact of Information Assurance on Resource Costs (IRC), with Best Case
conditions italicized in the upper right corner of the box.

Legend

Improved
Improved
Low Cost

Improved
Degraded
. High Cost

(Impioved)
Improved
Improved
High Cost

Improved
Improved
Low Cost

IA
(None)

IOC

(High Cost)

IRC

(Low Cost)

(Degraded)

(Improved)

None
Improved
Low Cost

None
Improved
High Cost

None
Degraded
Low Cost

Figure 3-1: The relationship between Information Assurance (IA), the Impact of IA on System Operational
Capability (IOC), and the Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC) [modified from Hamill, 2000: 4-2]

The model used to measure the decision to implement an IA strategy, the Information
Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM), is composed of three separate hierarchies: IA, IOC,
and IRC and is shown in Figure 3-2:
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Information Assurance
(IA)

ir
Impact of IA on System
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^^^
Impact of IA on Resource
Costs (IRC)

Figure 3-2: Information Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM)

The objective of the IAAM is to assist a decision-maker in determining which, if
any, IA strategies should be implemented. The level of information assurance at the
organization is captured in the IA hierarchy. It was not the objective of the model to
measure overall system operational capability or the current resource costs absorbed by
the organization, so these hierarchies do not attempt to do so. The latter two hierarchies
simply capture what impact implementing a new IA strategy has on the system
operational capability and resource costs, respectively.
The IA, IOC and IRC hierarchies were developed over a series of three separate
two to two and a half day meetings with AFTAC / Logistic Support Center (LSC)
personnel. Over twenty different information systems experts, including officers,
enlisted personnel, civilians, and civilian contractors participated in this study. Expert
opinion of all personnel involved with AFTAC information assurance, from senior
leadership to technical specialists, was carefully noted and incorporated into the models
[AFTAC / LSC, 2000-2001]. This study could not have been completed without the truly
extraordinary effort put forth by the AFTAC personnel.
The Information Assurance hierarchy will be discussed first, followed by the
Impact of IA on System Operational Capability hierarchy and then the Impact of IA on
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Resource Cost hierarchy. A more detailed discussion of each value and its respective
measures can be found in the Appendix.

3.2 Information Assurance Value Hierarchy
The IA hierarchy measures the ability of the system and system personnel to
assure information, information systems, and information processes. The hierarchy
obtains its fundamental focus from the definition of IA found in JP 3-13: Joint Doctrine
for Information Operations:
Information assurance is defined as Information Operations (10) that
protect and defend information systems by ensuring their availability,
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes
providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities [JP 3-13,1998:1-9].
Information Assurance is therefore a process that involves the ability to protect
information and information systems (IS), detect events that may interfere with
information or IS, and properly react to situations where information or IS may have been
compromised. The above definition shows that IA is not a synonym for computer
security; assurance is a much more robust concept that captures the entire process of
defending one's information, information systems, and information processes. Working
from JP 3-13 and the IA experts at AFTAC, it was therefore determined that an IA value
hierarchy for AMIS should be composed of protection, detection, and reaction
capabilities. The entire IA value hierarchy is given as Figure 3-3, with Information and
IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction composing the highest sub-tier of values.
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Figure 3-3: Information Assurance (IA) Value Hierarchy

3.2.1 Information and Information Systems (IS) Protection
Information and IS Protection is defined to be the measures taken to ensure that
information and information systems are protected from unauthorized change. This
includes assuring information and IS availability, confidentiality, and integrity. In
addition, AFTAC information assurance experts determined that compliance should also
be included under the Information and IS Protection sub-hierarchy since it captures the
ability of the system to protect against known vulnerabilities. Each of these subhierarchy elements are defined as follows:
Availability: Assured access by authorized users
Confidentiality: Protection from unauthorized disclosure
Integrity: Protection from unauthorized change
Compliance: Measures taken to decrease known vulnerabilities

43

Single dimensional value functions were developed to measure each of these sub-values.
Table 3-1 summarizes the measures used for each value under Information and IS
Protection:
Table 3-1: Evaluation Measures for Information and IS Protection

Confidentiality

Percentage of E-mail Service
Uptime
Percentage of Print Service
Uptime
Percentage of File Service
Uptime
Percentage of Internet Service
Uptime
Change in System Confidentiality

MEASURE
TYPE*
Percentage
(S-Curve)
Percentage
(S-Curve)
Percentage
(S-Curve)
Percentage
(S-Curve)
Category

Integrity

Change in System Integrity

Category
Percentage
(Linear)
Percentage
(S-Curve)

VALUE
Availability

MEASURE UNIT

Compliance

Percentage of Automated
Compliance Procedures
Percentage of Validated
Compliance
* (Shape) of value function, if applicable.

0

UPPER
BOUND
100

0

100

0

100

0

100

Greatly
Decreased

GreatlyDecreased

Greatly
Increased
Greatly
Increased

0

100

0

100

LOWER
BOUND

Table 3-1 shows that Availability has four separate single dimensional measure functions
since AFTAC personnel valued E-mail, Print, File, and Internet services on AMIS
differently. The measure function for Percentage of E-mail Service Uptime is shown in
Figure 3-4:
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Figure 3-4: Measure function for Percentage of Time E-mail Service is Available

The function is an S-shaped curve ranging from 80% to 100%. Any information
assurance strategy that would likely cause E-mail services on AMIS to be available 80%
of the time or less would receive a value of 0.0. This value increases slightly until 90%
availability, after which it begins to rise sharply. The sharp rise between 90% and 95%
availability signifies that AFTAC personnel value gains in this area more than any other
of the same magnitude. After 95% availability, AFTAC personnel feel that the service is
sufficiently available and therefore any gain above this level is not as valuable, although
obviously welcomed. Measure functions, such as shown in Figure 3-4, were also
developed for Print, File, and Internet services as well as all other values in the three
hierarchies. The complete collection of all values and their associated measure
function(s) can be found with a more detailed explanation in the Appendix.
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It is important to note that all alternatives, for this hierarchy and for the IRC and
IOC hierarchies, were scored in relation to the Baseline Case. This will be discussed in
more detail during the discussion on alternative scoring found in Chapter 4.
3.2.2 Detection
Detection is defined to be the ability of the system or system personnel to detect
an event. AFTAC personnel defined an event is any abnormal activity or action that
could potentially compromise the system or information contained within the system. An
event must be detected before any action can be taken. In order for an organization to
gain value from their detection capabilities, it must be done quickly, accurately, and at a
sufficient level. Detection is therefore separated into three sub-values: Timely,
Accountability, and Flexibility.
It is important to detect events as soon as possible since earlier detection will
allow earlier reaction, and provide the potential to minimize any negative impact of the
event. Although rapid detection is desired for any event, Timely is separated into subcategories because an IA strategy may have different detection capabilities and needs
depending on the method and origin of the event. The categories are composed of either
a physical event, which is any event affecting information or information systems
originating from a physical source (i.e. a fire), or an electronic event, defined to be an
event originating through communication networks. These categories are further
separated into events with either internal or external origins, since the organization values
their ability to detect events in a timely fashion differently depending on their origin.
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Note that whether an event is a result of malicious intent or an accident, it must be
detected in a timely manner.
Accountability is defined as the ability of a system to detect and correctly classify
events. This value is important because an event that is detected and classified
incorrectly, or not at all, could impede the ability of the organization to properly respond.
Accountability is separated into the Ability to Detect an Event and the Ability to Classify
an Event. The Ability to Detect an Event measures the system or system personnel's
ability to determine if an event actually occurred or is occurring. An organization that is
able to detect a high percentage of system events will be better able to protect against any
possible harm the event may cause. The Ability to Classify an Event captures the ability
of the system to correctly classify a detected event. It is important to properly categorize
events so that appropriate action may be taken.
Flexibility was defined as the ability to increase or decrease detection fidelity
based on the current INFOCON level. AFTAC personnel felt that is would be
advantageous to have the ability to adjust its level of assurance based on the current
threat level. In a low threat environment, AFTAC would operate at normal assurance
levels; as the threat level increases, so does AFTAC s need for information assurance.
There is a trade-off that exists between increasing system assurance and operational
capability. The consideration of this trade-off is why AFTAC would not necessarily want
to operate at the highest possible assurance level in a low threat environment. Table 3-2
summarizes the measures used in the Detection sub-hierarchy:
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Table 3-2: Evaluation Measures for Detection
VALUE
Timely

SUBOBJECTIVE
Physical
Internal
Electronic
Internal
Physical
External
Electronic
External

Accountability

Ability to
Detect an
Event
Ability to
Categorize an
Event

MEASURE UNIT
Time to Detect a
Physical Internal
Event
Time to Detect an
Electronic Internal
Event
Time to Detect a
Physical External
Event
Time to Detect an
Electronic External
Event
Percentage of
Automated Detection
Percentage of
Automated Detection

Is System Flexible?
Flexibility
* (Shape) of value function, if applicable.

LOWER
BOUND
0

UPPER
BOUND
20

0

10

0

8

Minutes
(Exponential)

0

120

Piecewise Linear

0

100

Piecewise Linear

0

100

Category

No

Yes

MEASURE
TYPE*
Days
(Reverse SCurve)
Days
(Reverse SCurve)
Hours
(Exponential)

3.2.3 Reaction
Reaction, in this study, is defined to be measures taken to (1) appropriately
respond to an identified attack, (2) restore the information and IS capabilities to an
acceptable state, their original state, or an improved state, and (3) the ability to learn from
previous events so that they do not cause damage in the future. Reaction is thus
separated into Respond, Restore, and Adapt. The period after an event is detected is
critical to the organization because this is the point at which any potential compromise
can be minimized and contained. The manner in which an organization reacts to the
event is of high importance since it could determine the extent to which information was
compromised.
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Respond captures the ability of the system or system personnel to take the proper
action during an event or after an event has occurred. It is separated into three values,
defined as follows:
Timely: The process of notifying the appropriate personnel after detecting
an event, identifying the event source, and then taking the proper action
against the event
Flexible Deterrence: Taking appropriate action at the appropriate time.
Verify: Ability of the system or system administrators to determine if
their actions, which include detecting, classifying, and responding to an
event, were appropriate.
Restore is defined to be the ability of the system and system personnel to restore
information or an information system to an acceptable level after an event. This must be
done in both a timely and accurate manner; thus Restore is separated into those respective
sub-values. Information must be restored quickly so that system personnel have access to
it and are able to use the information to perform their mission. Information that is
incorrect, however, has no value to system personnel since processing tainted information
could have a severe negative impact on the mission. The restoration of incorrect
information is therefore not acceptable.
The final value under the Reaction sub-hierarchy is Adapt / Learn. This is
defined to be the ability of the system or system personnel to learn from an event and
adapt to the new situations resulting from the event. Part of reacting to an event is
learning from that event so it does not occur in the future, and therefore cannot
compromise the system again. It is also important that personnel learn from any mistakes
made in the assurance process so that they will be better able to control future events.
Table 3-3 details the measure functions for the Reaction sub-hierarchy:
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Table 3-3: Evaluation Measures for Reaction
VALUE
Respond

SUBOBJECTIVE
Timely

Flexible
Deterrence
Verify

Restore

Timely

Accurately

Adapt/ Learn

MEASURE UNIT
Time to Notify
Support personnel
Time to Correctly
Identify an Event
Time to Take Proper
Action
Point at Which Event
can be Isolated
Did personnel
Detect, Identify, and
Act Properly?
Time to Restore Full
Infrastructure
Time to restore Data
Percentage of Data
Accurately
Recovered
Ability of Support
personnel to Teach
System

0

UPPER
BOUND
Instantaneous
Direct
2

0

60

System

Event Source

Category

No

Yes

Hours
(Exponential)
Days
(Exponential)
Percentage
(S-Curve)

0

6

0

5

20

100

System
Cannot
be
Taught
System
Does
Not
Adapt

System can be
Fully Taught

MEASURE
TYPE*
Proxy
(Category)
Hours
(Linear)
Minutes
(Linear)
Category

LOWER
BOUND
None

Category

Category

Ability of System to
Teach Itself

System Adapts
Automatically

* (Shape) of value function, if applicable.

Again, the Appendix presents a full explanation of the values and associated measure
functions.

3.3 The Impact of IA on System Operational Capability
The impact that an information assurance strategy will have on the system's
operational capability must be considered when determining what IA strategy or
strategies are best for a given organization. The purpose of an information system is to
help personnel accomplish their mission in a more efficient manner; if the system cannot
do this effectively then it is not a useful system. However, if the user cannot trust that
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information in the system is available, accurate, updated, and secure, then the user's
willingness to depend on the system is greatly decreased. There is a fine balance between
information assurance and system operational capability that must exist in order to have a
secure but usable system.
In order to isolate the impact of IA on system operational capability, the IOC
hierarchy captures only the impact that an IA strategy will have on the system, not the
overall system operational capability. Therefore, many of the measures are categorical
changes with respect to the baseline system. For example, as shown in Table 3-4, one
measure for Efficiency was the Ability to Process Users. This measure was composed of
the following categories, all in relation to the Baseline Case: Significantly Decreased,
Decreased, No Change, Increased, and Significantly Increased. When the baseline AMIS
system was scored, it received a 'No Change' since it did not impact current system
efficiency. The Baseline Case scored a 'No Change' for all such IOC measures. Figure
3-5 presents the complete IOC hierarchy:
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Figure 3-5: Impact of Information Assurance on System Operational Capability (IOC) Value Hierarchy

3.3.1 Efficiency
An efficient system can perform the required tasks quickly and consistently with
respect to the demands placed upon the system. It is important that the system is able to
process user demands rapidly and without fear of overloading the system. Efficiency is
therefore separated into the Ability of the System to Process Users and the Impact an IA
strategy will have on System Overhead. The Ability of the System to Process Users is
valuable since the system is in place to assist personnel in accomplishing their mission.
The speed at which they are able to perform the mission is critical to its success. The
impact an IA strategy will have on System Overhead is important because an IA strategy
that consumes too much system capacity will limit the system's ability to efficiently
process information. Again, these values are not designed to measure the overall
system's capabilities; they are designed to measure what impact an IA strategy will have
on system capabilities. Measure functions for Efficiency are detailed in Table 3-4:
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Table 3-4: Evaluation Measures for Efficiency
VALUE

MEASURE UNIT

Ability to
Change in User Throughput
Process
Users
Impact on
Change in System Capacity
System
Overhead
* (Shape) of value function, if applicable.

MEASURE TYPE*
Category

Category

LOWER
BOUND
Significantly
Decreased

UPPER
BOUND
Significantly
Increased

Significantly
Decreased

Significantly
Increased

3.3.2 Functionality
Functionality is defined as the usefulness offered to system clients by providing
information and information related capabilities, both desired and essential. This
includes the change in how often the system is Available due to an IA strategy and
whether or not the new IA strategy is Compatible with the existing system. Missions
Enabled is also included as a value since adding a new capability to the system would
increase its functionality. Based on AFTAC personnel expert opinion, it was determined
IA strategies that removed a critical mission or function would never be considered for
implementation for the system under study. Measure functions for Functionality are
explained in Table 3-5:
Table 3-5: Evaluation Measures for Functionality
VALUE
Missions
Enabled
Availability

MEASURE UNIT
Did Strategy enable System to
Perform new Mission?
Change in System Availability

Compatibility

Difficulty in Making New
Strategy Compatible
" (Shape) of value function, if applicable.
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MEASURE
TYPE*
Category

LOWER
BOUND
No

UPPER
BOUND
Yes

Category

Significantly
Decreased

Category

Complex

Significantly
Increased
No Difficulty

3.3.3 Convenience
Convenience is the level of complication needed to operate the system viewed
from both the user and administrator perspective. Convenience is separated into
Accessibility, which is the level of difficulty faced by the user in gaining access to
authorized systems, and Complexity, defined as the level of difficulty in using the
system, again for both for users and support personnel. Complexity was further separated
into User and Support Personnel since AFTAC experts deemed that it was far better to
have a system that it is easy for users to operate, yet more difficult for support personnel
to maintain, than it would be to have an easily maintainable system that was difficult to
use. Recall system availability has already been scored in a separate measure and is
therefore not considered under Convenience. Table 3-6 explains the measure functions
for Convenience:
Table 3-6: Evaluation Measures for Convenience
VALUE

SUBOBJECTIVE

MEASURE
UNIT
Accessibility
Degree of
Change in
System
Accessibility
Users
Degree of
Complexity
Change in
User
Complexity
Support
Degree of
Personnel (SP) Change in SP
Complexity
* (Shape) of value function, if applicable.

MEASURE
TYPE*
Category

LOWER
BOUND
Significantly
Decreased

UPPER
BOUND
Significantly
Increased

Category

Significantly
Increased

Significantly
Decreased

Category

Significantly
Increased

Significantly
Decreased

3.3.4 Ease of Implementation
The degree of difficulty associated with installing a new IA strategy is an
important consideration when comparing strategies. Ease of Implementation is
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composed of two separate values: the Time needed to Implement and Test a strategy, and
the Usage History ofthat strategy. The faster an IA strategy can be tested and
implemented, the earlier it can begin protecting the system and the less potential
disruption it will have on the users. Usage History is the 'track record' of an IA strategy
and is important because it gives personnel insight on how well the product or policy
fared in the past in similar situations. Usage History contains measures for both the
actual history of the product or policy as well as experience system personnel have with
using and / or maintaining it. Table 3-7 details measurement functions for the value Ease
of Implementation:
Table 3-7: Evaluation Measures for Ease of Implementation
VALUE
Time to
Implement and
Test

SUBOBJECTIVE
Software

Hardware
Physical

Usage History

MEASURE UNIT
Time to Implement
and Test
Time to Implement
and Test
Time to Implement
and Test
Amount of
Exposure Strategy
has in Similar
Industry
Amount of
Experience
Personnel have with
Strategy

MEASURE
TYPE*
Hours
(Reverse SCurve)
Days
Weeks
(Reverse SCurve)
Category

Category

LOWER
BOUND

UPPER
BOUND

0

6

0

6

0

4

No
Exposure

Industry
Standard

No
Experience

High
Experience

* (Shape) of value function, if applical jle.

3.3.5 Flexibility
The final value in the Impact of IA on System Operational Capability is
Flexibility, which in this hierarchy is defined to be the ability of the system to change
over time as technology evolves. The ability of the system to change with technology is
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dependent on its ability to be both Upgraded and Expanded, which is captured in the
model with those respective values. AFTAC experts determined that Upgradeability and
Expandability are binary Yes or No values since there was no clear measure to the degree
that all possible strategies are either upgradeable or expandable. This is further explained
in the Appendix. Measure functions for Flexibility are explained in Table 3-8:
Table 3-8: Evaluation Measures for Flexibility
VALUE

MEASURE UNIT

Upgradeability
Can Strategy be Upgraded?
Expandability
Can Strategy be Expanded?
* (Shape) of value function, if applicable.

MEASURE
TYPE*
Category
Category

LOWER
BOUND
No
No

UPPER
BOUND
Yes
Yes

3.4 Impact of IA on Resource Costs
The final consideration when determining what IA strategies to implement is the
impact the strategy will have on AFTAC resources. Resources Costs are both the fiscal
cost and manpower cost that an IA strategy will require. All other things being equal, the
strategy that requires the least amount of AFTAC resources, either financially or with
respect to personnel time, will be preferred. The complete IRC value hierarchy is
presented as Figure 3-6:
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Figure 3-6: Impact of Information Assurance on Resource Costs (IRC) Value Hierarchy

3.4.1 Life Cycle Acquisition Costs
Life Cycle Acquisition Costs is the dollar cost of an IA strategy needed to
implement and maintain that strategy over its lifetime. As in any acquisition, an IA
strategy that costs the least to acquire, implement, and maintain will be valued higher
than more expensive strategies, assuming that they provide an equal amount of assurance.
Air Force regulations consider computer system acquisitions differently than other
physical acquisitions; therefore they are treated differently in the value measures (again,
refer to the Appendix for specific details). Since different IA strategies will have a
varying life span, the maintenance costs are normalized to be the average dollar cost per
year. Strategies with a projected life span of twenty years can therefore be compared to
those with a projected life span of five years. The measure functions for Life Cycle
Acquisition Costs are explained in Table 3-9:
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Table 3-9: Evaluation Measures for Life Cycle Acquisition Costs
VALUE
Life Cycle
Acquisition
Costs

SUBOBJECTIVE
Initial

MEASURE UNIT

Dollar Cost for
Computer System
Dollar Cost for
Physical Construction
Recurring
Average Cost of IA
Strategy per Year
* (Shape) of value function, if applicable.

MEASURE
TYPE*
Dollars
(Reverse S-Curve)
Dollars
(Reverse S-Curve)
Dollars
(Linear)

LOWER
BOUND
0

UPPER
BOUND
1 million

0

5 million

0

200,000

3.4.2 Personnel
Along with a dollar cost, implementing and maintaining an IA strategy will
certainly consume organizational manpower. Users and support personnel are again
separated since they are valued differently when considering information assurance
strategies, with preference again given to the user. Although information assurance is
everyone's duty in the Air Force, user time spent on training in IA or lost due to IA
procedures is more valued than support personnel's time spent on IA, since information
assurance is not the primary mission of the information system user. It is, however, the
job of support personnel to insure that their systems are well assured. Therefore, an IA
strategy may impact the number of support personnel needed in addition to the support
personnel's time spent on assurance. This is the rationale for separating the value as
such. If the strategy automates a process formally done by support personnel, then less
support personnel may be needed, which in turn would lower the cost to the organization.
Measure functions for the Resource Cost of Personnel is explained in Table 3-10:
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Table 3-10: Evaluation Measures for Personnel
SUBOBJECTIVE

VALUE
User

MEASURE UNIT
Time Needed to Train
Users

Support
Personnel
(SP)

Time

Time Needed to
Initially Train SP in
Strategy
Frequency of Training
Strategy Requires

Time per Training
Session
Number
Percent Change in
Necessary SP due to
Strategy
* (Shape) of value function, if applicable.

MEASURE
TYPE*
Hours
(Reverse SCurve)
Days
(Reverse SCurve)
Ratio
(Piecewise
Linear)
Days
Percentage
(Reverse SCurve)

LOWER
BOUND
0

UPPER
BOUND
4

0

20

Daily

Yearly

0

3

-100

100

3.5 Weighting
Each value in the hierarchy was weighted using swing weighting. If a value had
more than one measure, then each measure was weighted using the same technique.
Figure 3-7, Figure 3-8, and Figure 3-9 show the weighted Information Assurance (IA),
Impact of IA on System Operational Capability (IOC), and Impact of IA on Resource
Cost (IRC) models respectively. Local weights are given above the parenthesized global
weights. The local weights for any given tier sum to 1.000 as do the global weights.
Note that global weights may not sum to exactly 1.000 due to rounding.

59

Information Assurance
(1A)

Information and IS Protection
4/7

Detection
2/7

Availability
1/9
(0.064)

Confidentiality
4/9
(0.254)

Integrity
3/9
(0.191)

Physical
Internal
1/35
(0.003)

Electronic
Internal
10/35
(0.030)

Accountability
15/27
(0.159)

Compliance
1/9
(0.064)

1

1

Ability to
Detect Event

Ability Accurately
Categorize Event

5/6

1/6

(0.132)

(0.027)

Flexibility
2/27
(0.021)

Figure 3-7: Weighted Information Assurance Hierarchy, Global Weight in Parentheses
Impact of IA on System
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Efficiency
20/81
Ability to Process
Users
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(0.049)
Impact on System
Overhead
4/5
(0.198)

I
Functionality
32/81

Convenience
20/81

Ease of Implementation
4/81

Flexibility
5/81

Missions
Enabled
1 /13
(0.030)

Accessibility
2/9
(0.055)

Time to Implement
and Test
2/5
(0.020)

Upgradability
1 /2
(0.031)

Availability

Complexity
7/9
(0.192)

Usage
History
3/5
(0.030)

Expandability
1 /2
(0.031)

(change in down time)

8/13
(0.243)
Compatiblity
4/13
(0.122)

Figure 3-8: Weighted Impact of IA on Operational Capability Hierarchy, Global Weight in Parentheses
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X

Impact of Information Assurance
on Resource Costs
(IRC)
I

Life Cycle Acquisition Costs
2/5

Personnel
3/5

I
User

Support Personnel

10/11
(0.545)

1/11
(0.055)

X
Time

1/6
(0.009)

Number
5/6
(0.046)

Figure 3-9: Weighted Impact of IA on Resource Costs Hierarchy, Global Weight in Parentheses

AFTAC information assurance experts weighted the lower tiers of the IA and IOC
hierarchies. The top-tier values in the IA and IOC hierarchies were weighted by the
commanding officers of the Communications and Information Support Division, to
whom the system experts reported. The commanders are the decision-makers ultimately
responsible for implementing information assurance strategies. The commanders also
weighted the complete IRC hierarchy since the acquisition process is directly under their
authority.

3.6 Methodology Summary
This chapter focused on the methodology used to develop, measure, and weight
the three separate hierarchies in the Information Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM).
Complete details are provided in the Appendix. The IAAM was used to first baseline the
system and then to score several information assurance strategies that were being
considered by AFTAC for implementation. A sensitivity analysis on the hierarchy
weights will be used to show potential changes in alternative rankings. Chapter 4 will
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discuss the results produced by the model, and provide insight as to how AFTAC can best
improve their level of information assurance.
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4. Results

The primary objective of this thesis was to provide an information assurance
model to an operational Department of Defense (DoD) organization to aid in evaluating
and improving their information security. The previous chapter focused on the
methodology used to create the Information Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM), which
was built in cooperation with the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) at
Patrick AFB, FL. Recall that the IAAM is composed of three separate hierarchies:
Information Assurance (IA), the Impact of IA on System Operational Capability (IOC),
and the Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC). Together, these three hierarchies were
used to evaluate several different information assurance strategies under consideration for
implementation into the AFTAC Mission Information System (AMIS), the chosen system
for this study. This chapter will analyze the results of each strategy, as well as provide
insight as to where AFTAC can best improve their assurance on AMIS. Recall that a
detailed description of each measure and its associated single dimensional value function
is provided in the Appendix. The Microsoft Excel © spreadsheet model developed as
part of this research was used to supplement this analysis.

4.1 The Baseline System
In order evaluate improvements in information assurance on AMIS it was first
necessary to measure its current state of IA. Each proposed alternative could then be
compared to the current AMIS configuration, the Baseline Case, to determine which
course of action would most benefit AFTAC s information assurance. The Baseline Case
and all other alternatives were scored exactly as described in the Value Focused Thinking
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(VFT) section of Chapter 2. Since AFTAC can choose not to make any modifications to
AMIS, the Baseline Case is considered an alternative in this study.
To review, each value within a hierarchy is measured by one or more single
dimensional value functions that completely capture the value. For example, under the
Information and Information Systems (IS) sub-hierarchy, Availability is a value shown in
Figure 4-1:
Imformation Assurance
(IA)

Figure 4-1: Availability

This value is measured by four separate functions: percentage of time E-mail service is
available, percentage of time Print service is available, percentage of time File service is
available, and percentage of time Internet service is available. The function measuring
the percentage of time E-mail Service is available, developed with AFTAC information
assurance experts, is shown in Figure 4-2:
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Figure 4-2: Measure function for Percentage of Time E-mail Service is Available

During the scoring session, AFTAC experts were asked to determine what percentage of
time E-mail is currently available on AMIS. AFTAC information assurance personnel
were shown only the x-axis to each value, and not the actual function itself, to reduce the
chance for bias.
Figure 4-3 gives the x-axis for 'Percentage of Time E-mail Service is Available'
as it appeared on the scoring sheet used by AFTAC personnel.

80%

85%

90%

95%

100%

Figure 4-3: X-axis of Percentage of time E-mail Service is Available

AFTAC experts determined that the percentage of time E-mail service was available on
the current system was 97%. This score was later converted into a value using the
function shown in Figure 4-2. The scoring process was continued using the same x-axis
format until all measures in the IAAM model were scored.

65

Table 4-1 shows the score and corresponding value for each measure under the
Information Assurance hierarchy for the Baseline Case. The top-tier values in the
hierarchy appear on the left margin of the table, with their respective sub-objectives
displayed to the right. Note that not all weights in Tables 4-1 through 4-12 sum to
exactly 1.000 due to rounding.
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Table 4-1: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IA hierarchy - Baseline Case
Objective
Information
and IS
Protection

SubObjective 1
Availability

SubObjective 2

Confidentiality
Integrity
Compliance

Detection

Timely

Accountability

Reaction

Flexibility
Respond

Physical
Internal
Electronic
Internal
Physical
External
Electronic
External
Ability to
Detect Event
Ability to
Categorize
Event
Timely

Flexible
Deterrence
Verify
Restore

Timely

Accurately
Adapt / Learn

Local
Weight
0.176

Global
Weight
0.011

Score

Value

97

0.880

0.176
0.588
0.059

0.011
0.037
0.004

99
99
95

0.960
0.960
0.800

1.000

0.254

No Change

0.500

1.000
0.200

0.190
0.012

No Change
45

0.500
0.451

0.800

0.051

90

0.900

1.000

0.003

2

0.913

Time to Detect

1.000

0.030

3

0.700

Time to Detect

1.000

0.012

4

0.167

Time to Detect

1.000

0.060

1

0.950

% Automated
Detection
% Automated
Detection

1.000

0.132

80

0.600

1.000

0.026

75

0.570

Is System Flexible?
Time to Notify
Support Personnel
(SP)
Time to Correctly
ID Event
Time to Take
Proper Action
Point at Which
Event Isolated
Did SP Detect, ID,
Act Properly?
Time to Restore
Full Infrastructure
Time to Restore
Data
% Recoverable
Information
Ability ofSP to
Teach System
Ability ofSystem to
Teach Itself

1.000
0.500

0.021
0.032

Yes
Instantaneous
Indirect

1.000
0.900

0.250

0.016

0.750

0.625

0.250

0.016

15

0.750

1.000

0.006

0.150

1.000

0.016

Single
Server
Yes

0.500

0.005

1.500

0.625

0.500

0.005

2.500

0.250

1.000

0.032

90

0.417

0.143

0.002

0.500

0.857

0.012

Partially
Taught
Cannot
Adapt

Measure
% Email Service Up
Time (UT)
% Print Service UT
% File Service UT
% Internet Service
UT
Change in
Confidentiality
Change in Integrity
% Automated
Compliance
Procedures
% Validated
Compliance
Time to Detect
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1.000

0.000

Overall, the baseline system scored well in the Information Assurance hierarchy
receiving a 0.618 out of a possible 1.000. Again, this score is the global weight of each
measure multiplied by its associated value, summed across all measures in the hierarchy.
The present AMIS system scored well in Availability, where all four measures scored a
0.800 or higher, and Time to Detect Electronic External Events, which received a score
of 0.950. Flexibility and Verify both received perfect scores of 1.000, although these
measures are weighted significantly less than Availability or Time to Detect Electronic
External Events.
It is apparent that several values in the Baseline Case offer potential for
improvement. Six of the twenty-five measures scored below a 0.500 out of a possible
1.000: Percentage of Automated Compliance Procedures (0.450), Time to Detect
Physical External Events (0.167), Point at which Event is Isolated (0.150), Time to
Restore Data (0.250), Percentage of Recoverable Information (0.417), and Ability of
System to Teach Itself (0.000). It should be noted that the Baseline Case also scored
moderately in Confidentiality and Integrity, each receiving a 0.500. Since these values
were measured in relation to the Baseline Case, the Baseline Case itself must receive a
'No Change.' Since Confidentiality and Integrity were the highest weighted measures in
the IA hierarchy, with global weights of 0.254 and 0.190 respectively, the effect to the
overall IA score was pronounced.
The Baseline Case was also scored against the Impact of IA on System
Operational Capability (IOC) and Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC) models. Since
the IOC hierarchy measured the impact implementing new IA strategies would have on
current system operational capability, many of the values scored 'No Change.' This is by
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design, since there will be no impact on the current system if no IA strategies are
implemented. Values that were not measured as a change to the Baseline system were
scored to represent the system in its original state. For example, AFTAC experts
determined that the usage of current system hardware and software is widespread,
therefore the system components were considered to be an 'Industry Standard.' Table
4-2 records the score and corresponding value for each measure under the IOC hierarchy
for the Baseline Case:
Table 4-2: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IOC hierarchy - Baseline Case
Objective
Efficiency

SubSubObjective 1
Objective 2
Ability to Process Users

Impact on System Overhead

Functionality

Missions Enabled

Availability
Compatibility
Convenience

Accessibility
Complexity

Ease of
Implementation

Support
Personnel
(SP)
Time to Implement and Test

Usage History

Flexibility

User

Upgradeability
Expandability

Local
Weight
1.000

Global
Weight
0.049

1.000

Score

Value

No
Change

0.600

0.198

No
Change

0.600

1.000

0.030

No

0.000

1.000

0.243

0.900

1.000

0.122

No
Change
Simple

1.000

0.055

0.500

1.000

0.154

No
Change
No
Change

1.000

0.038

No
Change

0.600

Software
Hardware
Physical
Exposure in
Similar
Industry
SP Experience

0.615
0.308
0.077
0.200

0.012
0.006
0.002
0.006

2
2
4
Industry
Standard

0.800
0.600
0.000
1.000

0.800

0.024

0.550

Can System be
Upgraded?
Can System be
Expanded?

1.000

0.031

Moderate
Experience
Yes

1.000

0.031

Yes

1.000

Measure
Change in
User
Throughput
Change in
System
Capacity
Did Strategy
Enable New
Mission?
Change in
Availability
Degree of
Difficulty
Change in
Accessibility
Change in
User
Complexity
Change in SP
Complexity
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0.900

0.500

1.000

The AMIS Baseline Case received a score of 0.698 in the IOC hierarchy. AMIS
currently scores well in 'Time to Implement and Test Software' (0.800), fair in 'Time to
Implement and Test Hardware' (0.600), and poor in 'Time to Implement Physical
Strategies' (0.000). Although 'Time to Implement Physical Strategies' has a global
weight of only 0.002, it is an area for improvement. It should be noted, however, that it
is an area beyond AFTAC's direct control. The Baseline Case uses 'Industry Standard'
IA strategies, and therefore received a score of 1.000 on the 'Exposure in Similar
Industry' measure. Improvement could be made in 'Support Personnel Experience with
the IA Strategies' however, as this measure received a value score of only a 0.550. All
other measures in this hierarchy were designed to capture changes in AFTAC IA
strategies, and therefore the Baseline Case scores a 'No Change' in these measures. It is
important to note that a score of 'No Change,' in relation to system operational
capability, is a desirable score since most IA strategies tend to decrease operational
capabilities.
With respect to the Baseline Case, the Impact of IA on Resource Costs model was
used to determine the fiscal cost and cost of personnel time. For example, AFTAC cost
experts determined that current IA strategies cost approximately $100,000 per year. That
number is used as the baseline for the 'Average Cost per Year' measure. Table 4-3
presents the score and corresponding value for each measure under the IRC hierarchy for
the Baseline Case:
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Table 4-3: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IRC hierarchy - Baseline Case
Objective

SubObjective 1
Initial

Life Cycle
Acquisition
Costs

SubObjective 2

Recurring
Personnel

User

Support
Personnel
(SP)

Time

Number

Measure
Computer
System
Physical
Construction
Normalized
Cost per Year
Time Needed
to Learn IA
Strategy
Initial Time to
Train SP
Frequency of
Training
Time per
Training
Session
% Change in
SP Needed

Local
Weight
0.333

Global
Weight
0.133

Score

Value

0

1.000

0.333

0.133

0

1.000

0.333

0.133

100000

0.500

1.000

0.545

3

0.100

0.143

0.001

5

0.600

0.571

0.005

Quarterly

0.500

0.286

0.003

0.250

0.950

1.000

0.045

0.000

0.700

The Baseline Case scored only a 0.425 in the IRC hierarchy. This low overall
IRC score is due, in part, to the undesirable score (0.100) the current AMIS configuration
received in User 'Time to Learn IA Strategy.' Since this measure is weighted at 0.545,
even a slight improvement in this area would produce a material increase in IRC to
AFTAC.
Since the current AMIS configuration has been paid for, and as such is a sunk
cost, there is no initial cost to AFTAC to keep the system in its present state. For this
reason, the initial costs for 'Computer System' and 'Physical Construction' both received
scores of 1.000.
After the Baseline Case was scored, three different information assurance
alternatives were scored. These alternatives were IA strategies that were under
consideration for implementation on AMIS at the time of this study. When applicable,
each measure received a Most Likely Case score, a Best Case score, and a Worst Case
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score since AFTAC experts were predicting how the system would perform if the
strategy were implemented, rather than rating the strategy after implementation. The
three strategies considered were Internet Security Scanner (ISS), Enterprise Security
Manager (ESM), and Cisco Secure Intrusion Detection System (IDS). It is important to
note that these strategies are not necessarily competing with each other; each performs a
specific and independent function and thus all three could be implemented
simultaneously. They are individually evaluated in the following sections to illustrate
how the analysis model can be used.

4.2 Internet Security Scanner (ISS) - Most Likely Case
The Internet Security Scanner is a vulnerability scanner manufactured by Internet
Security Systems, Inc. This product would provide AFTAC with the ability to
Scan network communication services, operating systems, routers, e-mail
and Web servers, firewalls, and applications, thereby identifying system
weaknesses which could result in unauthorized network access [ISS,
2001].
Table 4-4 details the scores assigned by AFTAC experts based on the Most Likely results
from implementing ISS, along with the corresponding value for each measure.
A summary of the Worst Case and Best Case conditions for all alternatives will
follow sequentially after the Most Likely Case for each strategy has been presented. It
should be noted that all reported scores for ISS, ESM, and Cisco Secure IDS in this
section reflect the strategy's contribution to the existing AMIS configuration. The scores
are the expected outcome with that specific strategy implemented on the current system,
the Baseline Case.
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Table 4-4: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IA hierarchy - ISS Most Likely Case
Objective
Information
and IS
Protection

SubObjective 1
Availability

SubObjective 2

Confidentiality
Integrity
Compliance

Detection

Timely

Accountability

Reaction

Flexibility
Respond

Physical
Internal
Electronic
Internal
Physical
External
Electronic
External
Ability to
Detect Event
Ability to
Categorize
Event
Timely

Flexible
Deterrence
Verify
Restore

Timely

Accurately
Adapt / Learn

Local
Weight
0.176

Global
Weight
0.011

Score

Value

97

0.880

0.176
0.588
0.059

0.011
0.037
0.004

99
99
95

0.960
0.960
0.800

1.000

0.254

Increased

0.750

1.000
0.200

0.190
0.012

Increased
60

0.800
0.601

0.800

0.051

90

0.900

1.000

0.003

2

0.913

Time to Detect

1.000

0.030

3

0.700

Time to Detect

1.000

0.012

4

0.167

Time to Detect

1.000

0.060

1

0.950

% Automated
Detection
% Automated
Detection

1.000

0.132

80

0.600

1.000

0.026

75

0.570

Is System Flexible?
Time to Notify
Support Personnel
(SP)
Time to Correctly
ID Event
Time to Take
Proper Action
Point at Which
Event Isolated
Did SP Detect, ID,
Act Properly?
Time to Restore
Full Infrastructure
Time to Restore
Data
% Recoverable
Information
Ability ofSP to
Teach System
Ability ofSystem to
Teach Itself

1.000
0.500

0.021
0.032

Yes
Instantaneous
Indirect

1.000
0.900

0.250

0.016

0.750

0.625

0.250

0.016

15

0.750

1.000

0.006

0.150

1.000

0.016

Single
Server
Yes

0.500

0.005

1.500

0.625

0.500

0.005

2.500

0.250

1.000

0.032

90

0.417

0.143

0.002

1.000

0.857

0.012

Fully
Taught
Adapts with
SP Help

Measure
% Email Service Up
Time (UT)
% Print Service UT
% File Service UT
% Internet Service
UT
Change in
Confidentiality
Change in Integrity
% Automated
Compliance
Procedures
% Validated
Compliance
Time to Detect
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1.000

0.900

AMIS, with the ISS strategy implemented, received an overall score of 0.753 in
the IA hierarchy. The reason for the material change over the Baseline Case comes
mainly from the Confidentiality and Integrity measures, where ISS received 0.750 and
0.800 respectively. Recall that these measures account for 44.4% of the total possible IA
score; therefore any positive change from the Baseline Case results in substantial
improvement. With ISS, the number of measures that scored below a 0.500 was reduced
to four, with room for improvement still existing in 'Time to Detect Physical External
Events,' 'Point at which Event can be Isolated,' 'Time to Restore Data,' and 'Percentage
of Recoverable Information.'
The impact to system operational capability caused by installing ISS was
considered next. Again, AFTAC experts were asked to score the Most Likely Case, the
Best Case, and the Worst Case when applicable. The results for the Most Likely Case are
presented in Table 4-5. The IOC hierarchy measures the impact installing an IA strategy
will have on the system; all scores are therefore in relation to the Baseline Case presented
above.
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Table 4-5: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IOC hierarchy - ISS Most Likely Case
Objective
Efficiency

SubSubObjective 1
Objective 2
Ability to Process Users

Impact on System Overhead

Functionality

Missions Enabled

Availability
Compatibility
Convenience

Accessibility
Complexity

Ease of
Implementation

Support
Personnel
(SP)
Time to Implement and Test

Usage History

Flexibility

User

Upgradeability
Expandability

Local
Weight
1.000

Global
Weight
0.049

1.000

Score

Value

No
Change

0.600

0.198

Decrease

0.200

1.000

0.030

No

0.000

1.000

0.243

0.900

1.000

0.122

No
Change
Simple

1.000

0.055

0.500

1.000

0.154

No
Change
No
Change

1.000

0.038

Moderate
Increase

0.300

Software
Hardware
Physical
Exposure in
Similar
Industry
SP Experience

0.615
0.308
0.077
0.200

0.012
0.006
0.002
0.006

2
2
4
Industry
Standard

0.800
0.600
0.000
1.000

0.800

0.024

0.100

Can System be
Upgraded?
Can System be
Expanded?

1.000

0.031

Minimal
Experience
Yes

1.000

0.031

Yes

1.000

Measure
Change in
User
Throughput
Change in
System
Capacity
Did Strategy
Enable New
Mission?
Change in
Availability
Degree of
Difficulty
Change in
Accessibility
Change in
User
Complexity
Change in SP
Complexity

0.900

0.500

1.000

ISS received an overall score of 0.597 in the IOC hierarchy. The strategy scored
poorly since personnel believed it would decrease 'System Capacity,' moderately
increase 'Support Personnel Complexity,' and because most personnel had limited
experience with the product, 'Support Personnel Experience' would also decrease.
Combined, these three measures account for about 26% of the total IOC score possible.
ISS did not improve over the Baseline Case in any measure in the IOC hierarchy.
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Table 4-6 details the impact ISS will have on AFTAC's resource costs. There is
no initial cost to purchase ISS since this product can be licensed from Internet Security
Systems, Inc. free of charge to AFTAC. However, it will require initial training for
AFTAC personnel. Therefore, the cost to train personnel (the majority of which is travel
costs) is considered under initial computer systems purchase for all alternatives. Since
the objective is to measure the impact on AFTAC resources, all costs were added to the
Baseline Case for each alternative. Table 4-6 shows the measure score and
corresponding value for the IRC hierarchy for the ISS Most Likely Case.
Table 4-6: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IRC hierarchy - ISS Most Likely Case
Objective
Life Cycle
Acquisition
Costs

SubObjective 1
Initial

SubObjective 2

Recurring
Personnel

User

Support
Personnel
(SP)

Time

Number

Measure
Computer
System
Physical
Construction
Normalized
Cost per Year
Time Needed
to Learn IA
Strategy
Initial Time to
Train SP
Frequency of
Training
Time per
Training
Session
% Change in
SP Needed

Local
Weight
0.333

Global
Weight
0.133

Score

Value

0.010

0.990

0.333

0.133

0.000

1.000

0.333

0.133

105000

0.475

1.000

0.545

3

0.100

0.143

0.001

7

0.460

0.571

0.005

Quarterly

0.500

0.286

0.003

0.250

0.950

1.000

0.045

5

0.400

ISS received a score of 0.407 in the IRC hierarchy. Although ISS is relatively
inexpensive to maintain, it nonetheless scores worse than the Baseline Case since it is
slightly more expensive than maintaining the current system. AFTAC personnel can also
expect additional training to learn ISS, which also contributed to lowering ISS's overall
IRC score.
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While ISS will improve AMIS information assurance, it will do it at a cost to
system operational capability and AFTAC resources.

4.3 Enterprise Security Manager (ESM) - Most Likely Case
The Enterprise Security Manager is an Air Force wide information assurance
product that is provided at the base level. ESM was formerly manufactured by AXENT
Technologies, who merged with the Symantec Corporation, the current product provider.
ESM grants the
ability to automate the planning, management and control of security
policy from a single location, thereby saving time and money. [It] does
this by giving the ability to offload the repetitive and redundant tasks
associated with managing such a policy to computers rather than relying
on human staff members [Symantec, 2000].
AFTAC information assurance specialists were again asked to score ESM on the Most
Likely Case, the Best Case, and the Worst Case. The Most Likely information assurance
provided by the Enterprise Security Manager on AMIS, as determined by AFTAC
experts, is shown in Table 4-7. A summary of the results from the Worst and Best Cases
will follow after the Most Likely Cases have been presented for each strategy.

77

Table 4-7: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IA hierarchy - ESM Most Likely Case
Objective
Information
and IS
Protection

SubObjective 1
Availability

SubObjective 2

Confidentiality
Integrity
Compliance

Detection

Timely

Accountability

Reaction

Flexibility
Respond

Physical
Internal
Electronic
Internal
Physical
External
Electronic
External
Ability to
Detect Event
Ability to
Categorize
Event
Timely

Flexible
Deterrence
Verify
Restore

Timely

Accurately
Adapt / Learn

Global
Weight
0.011

Score

Value

97

0.880

0.176
0.588
0.059

0.011
0.037
0.004

99
99
95

0.960
0.960
0.800

1.000

0.254

No Change

0.500

1.000
0.200

0.190
0.012

Increased
80

0.800
0.801

0.800

0.051

95

0.950

1.000

0.003

2

0.913

Time to Detect

1.000

0.030

3

0.700

Time to Detect

1.000

0.012

4

0.167

Time to Detect

1.000

0.060

1

0.950

% Automated
Detection
% Automated
Detection

1.000

0.132

80

0.600

1.000

0.026

75

0.570

Is System Flexible?
Time to Notify
Support Personnel
(SP)
Time to Correctly
ID Event
Time to Take
Proper Action
Point at Which
Event Isolated
Did SP Detect, ID,
Act Properly?
Time to Restore
Full Infrastructure
Time to Restore
Data
% Recoverable
Information
Ability ofSP to
Teach System
Ability of System to
Teach Itself

1.00
0.500

0.021
0.032

Yes
Instantaneous
Indirect

1.000
0.900

0.250

0.016

0.750

0.625

0.250

0.016

15

0.750

1.000

0.006

0.150

1.000

0.016

Single
Server
Yes

0.500

0.005

1.500

0.625

0.500

0.005

2.500

0.250

1.000

0.032

90

0.417

0.143

0.002

0.500

0.857

0.012

Partially
Taught
Cannot
Adapt

Measure
% Email Service Up
Time (UT)
% Print Service UT
% File Service UT
% Internet Service
UT
Change in
Confidentiality
Change in Integrity
% Automated
Compliance
Procedures
% Validated
Compliance
Time to Detect
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Local
Weight
0.176

1.000

0.000

The ESM strategy scored a 0.683 in the Information Assurance hierarchy, a slight
increase over the current system. Part of the reason ESM scored relatively low was that
AFTAC personnel believed it would not increase 'Confidentiality,' the single highest
weighted measure in the IA hierarchy. ESM is designed to improve system compliance,
where it received high scores in both 'Percentage of Automated Compliance Procedures'
and 'Percentage of Validated Compliance' measures. However, 'Compliance' was not as
heavily weighted. ESM's highly concentrated contribution to IA in Compliance did not
have as material an impact as the other strategies.
The most likely projected impact ESM will have on system operational capability
is shown in Table 4-8:
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Table 4-8: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IOC hierarchy - ESM Most Likely Case
Objective
Efficiency

SubSubObjective 1
Objective 2
Ability to Process Users

Impact on System Overhead

Functionality

Missions Enabled

Availability
Compatibility
Convenience

Accessibility
Complexity

Ease of
Implementation

Support
Personnel
(SP)
Time to Implement and Test

Usage History

Flexibility

User

Upgradeability
Expandability

Score

Value

Decrease

0.200

0.198

No
Change

0.600

1.000

0.030

No

0.000

1.000

0.243

0.900

1.000

0.122

No
Change
Simple

1.000

0.055

0.500

1.000

0.154

No
Change
No
Change

1.000

0.038

Minimal
Increase

0.450

Software
Hardware
Physical
Exposure in
Similar
Industry
SP Experience

0.615
0.308
0.077
0.200

0.012
0.006
0.002
0.006

4
2
4
Industry
Standard

0.500
0.600
0.000
1.000

0.800

0.024

0.100

Can System be
Upgraded?
Can System be
Expanded?

1.000

0.031

Minimal
Experience
Yes

1.000

0.031

Yes

1.000

Measure
Change in
User
Throughput
Change in
System
Capacity
Did Strategy
Enable New
Mission?
Change in
Availability
Degree of
Difficulty
Change in
Accessibility
Change in
User
Complexity
Change in SP
Complexity

Local
Weight
1.000

Global
Weight
0.049

1.000

0.900

0.500

1.000

ESM received an overall IOC score of 0.658. ESM decreased overall IOC
because AFTAC experts believed it would slightly decrease 'User Throughput' and
minimally increase 'Support Personnel Complexity.' ESM scored exactly as the Baseline
Case in all other measures. The impact ESM is projected to have on AFTAC resources is
shown in Table 4-9:
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Table 4-9: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IRC hierarchy -ESM Most Likely
Objective
Life Cycle
Acquisition
Costs

SubObjective 1
Initial

SubObjective 2

Recurring
Personnel

User

Support
Personnel
(SP)

Time

Number

Measure
Computer
System
Physical
Construction
Normalized
Cost per Year
Time Needed
to Learn IA
Strategy
Initial Time to
Train SP
Frequency of
Training
Time per
Training
Session
% Change in
SP Needed

Local
Weight
0.333

Global
Weight
0.133

Score

Value

0.010

0.990

0.333

0.133

0.000

1.000

0.333

0.133

105000

0.475

1.000

0.545

3

0.100

0.143

0.001

6

0.530

0.571

0.005

Quarterly

0.500

0.286

0.003

0.250

0.950

1.000

0.045

-5

0.800

ESM scored the same as the Baseline system in the IRC hierarchy, with a score of
0.425, implying that the strategy will not add to current AMIS resource costs. The need
for improvement in the User 'Time Needed to Learn an IA Strategy' measure remains.
ESM is expected to add information assurance to AMIS, while decreasing its operational
capability, and leaving resource costs unaffected when the Most Likely Case is
considered.

4.4 Cisco Secure Intrusion Detection System (IDS) - Most Likely Case
Formerly known as Cisco NetRanger, the Cisco Secure IDS is a hardware /
software intrusion detection device "designed to detect, report, and terminate
unauthorized activity throughout a network" [Cisco, 2000]. Table 4-10 presents the most
likely projected information assurance results for the Cisco Secure IDS strategy.
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Table 4-10: Scores anc corresponding values for each measure in the IA hierarchy - Cisco Secure IDS
Most Likely Case
Objective
SubSubGlobal
Score
Measure
Local
Objective 1
Objective 2
Weight Weight
Information Availability
0.176
0.011
97
% Email Service Up
and IS
Time (UT)
Protection
99
% Print Service UT
0.176
0.011
0.037
99
% File Service UT
0.588
0.004
95
% Internet Service UT
0.059
Confidentiality
0.254
Greatly
Change in
1.000
Increased
Confidentiality
Greatly
Integrity
Change in Integrity
1.000
0.190
Increased
0.012
45
Compliance
% Automated
0.200
Compliance
Procedures
90
% Validated
0.800
0.051
Compliance
Timely
2
Detection
Physical
Time to Detect
1.000
0.003
Internal
0.030
3
Electronic
Time to Detect
1.000
Internal
0.012
4
Physical
Time to Detect
1.000
External
0.060
0.5
Time to Detect
1.000
Electronic
External
Accountability Ability to
0.132
96
% Automated
1.000
Detect Event Detection
90
Ability to
1.000
0.026
% Automated
Categorize
Detection
Event
0.021
Yes
Flexibility
1.000
Is System Flexible?
Instantaneous
0.032
Reaction
Respond
0.500
Timely
Time to Notify Support
Direct
Personnel (SP)
0.75
0.250
0.016
Time to Correctly ID
Event
0.016
15
Time to Take Proper
0.250
Action
Single
1.000
0.006
Flexible
Point at Which Event
Service
Deterrence
Isolated
Yes
Verify
1.000
0.016
Did SP Detect, ID, Act
Properly?
1.5
0.500
0.005
Restore
Timely
Time to Restore Full
Infrastructure
2.5
0.005
Time to Restore Data
0.500
0.032
90
% Recoverable
1.000
Accurately
Information
Fully Taught
0.002
Ability ofSP to Teach
0.143
Adapt / Learn
System
0.012
Adapts with
0.857
Ability ofSystem to
SP Help
Teach Itself

82

Value
0.880
0.960
0.960
0.800
1.000
1.000
0.451

0.900
0.913
0.700
0.167
0.975
0.920
0.828

1.000
1.000
0.625
0.750
0.750
1.000
0.625
0.250
0.417
1.000
0.900

Cisco Secure IDS scored very well in the Information Assurance hierarchy,
improving the overall score to a 0.910. The reason Cisco Secure IDS scored well in the
IA hierarchy was because it is expected to greatly increase both 'Confidentiality' and
'Integrity.' Receiving a score of 1.000 in each of these measures results in Cisco Secure
IDS scoring at least 0.222 higher than the Baseline in their respective overall IA scores.
The strategy also has the ability to adapt with personnel help, notify support personnel
instantaneously and directly during an event, and scores the same or better in all
measures in relation to the Baseline Case.
The Cisco Secure IDS was then scored to determine its impact on system
operational capability, as shown in Table 4-11:
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Table 4-11: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in
Cisco Secure IDS Most Likely Case
Local
Measure
SubObjective
SubWeight
Objective 2
Objective 1
1.000
Change in
Ability to Process Users
Efficiency
User
Throughput
1.000
Change in
Impact on System Overhead
System
Capacity
1.000
Did
Strategy
Missions Enabled
Functionality
Enable New
Mission?
1.000
Change in
Availability
Availability
1.000
Degree of
Compatibility
Difficulty
1.000
Change in
Accessibility
Convenience
Accessibility
1.000
Change in
User
Complexity
User
Complexity
1.000
Change in SP
Support
Complexity
Personnel
(SP)
0.615
Ease of
Software
Time to Implement and Test
Implementation
0.308
Hardware
0.077
Physical
0.200
Exposure in
Usage History
Similar
Industry
SP Experience 0.800
Flexibility

Upgradeability
Expandability

Can System be
Upgraded?
Can System be
Expanded?

the IOC hierarchy Score

Value

No
Change

0.600

0.198

No
Change

0.600

0.030

No

0.000

0.243

Increase

0.950

0.122

Moderate

0.600

0.055

No
Change
No
Change

0.500

0.038

Moderate
Increase

0.300

0.012
0.006
0.002
0.006

2
2
4
Industry
Standard

0.800
0.600
0.000
1.000

0.024

0.100

1.000

Global
Weight
0.049

0.154

1.000

0.031

Minimal
Experience
Yes

1.000

0.031

Yes

0.500

1.000

Although Cisco Secure IDS received the highest IA score, it did not fair as well in
IOC, earning a score of a 0.651. It scored lower than the Baseline Case in several
measures, taking its most severe decrease in Compatibility's sub-value 'Degree of
Difficulty.' It improved upon the Baseline Case in Availability, which helped its IOC
score since this measure carried a weight of 0.243.
The projected impact of installing Cisco Secure IDS would have on AFTAC
resources is captured in Table 4-12:
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Table 4-12: Scores and corresponding values for each measure in the IRC hierarchy Cisco Secure IDS Most Likely Case
Objective
Life Cycle
Acquisition
Costs

SubObjective 1
Initial

SubObjective 2

Recurring
Personnel

User

Support
Personnel
(SP)

Time

Number

Measure
Computer
System
Physical
Construction
Normalized
Cost per Year
Time Needed
to Learn IA
Strategy
Initial Time to
Train SP
Frequency of
Training
Time per
Training
Session
% Change in
SP Needed

Local
Weight
0.333

Global
Weight
0.133

Score

Value

0.050

0.950

0.333

0.133

0.000

1.000

0.333

0.133

100000

0.500

1.000

0.545

3

0.100

0.143

0.001

15

0.100

0.571

0.005

Quarterly

0.500

0.286

0.003

0.250

0.950

1.000

0.045

10

0.100

When compared on costs alone, the Cisco Secure IDS strategy is not costeffective, receiving a score of only 0.391. The strategy's high cost results from its impact
on AFTAC Personnel. The User 'Time Needed to Learn an IA Strategy,' 'Initial Time to
Train Support Personnel,' and 'Percentage Change in Support Personnel Needed' all
scored only a 0.100. Like the other alternatives, the strategy would cost AFTAC a
minimal amount of fiscal resources.
Cisco Secure IDS greatly improves the information assurance of AMIS, however
it does it at a marginal cost to both system operational capability and AFTAC resources.

4.5 Alternative Comparisons - Most Likely Case
While ISS, ESM, and Cisco Secure IDS could be implemented simultaneously, it
is important to determine which alternative would provide the most information
assurance to AFTAC. The alternative that ranks highest in each hierarchy will provide
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the most benefit to the decision-maker for that particular hierarchy. If an alternative
ranks above another in one or more hierarchies and the same as another alternative in the
remaining hierarchies, then it is said to dominate that alternative. Table 4-13 ranks each
alternative with respect to the Information Assurance hierarchy, with the top tier values
Information and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction included. The score ofthat
strategy within the given sub-hierarchy is given in parentheses.
Table 4-13: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IA - Most Likely Case
Alternative

Baseline
ISS Most Likely
ESM Most Likely
Cisco Secure IDS
Most Likely

Information and
IS Protection
(max = 0.571)
4 (0.333)
2 (0.456)
3 (0.397)
1 (0.555)

Detection
(max = 0.286)

Reaction
(max = 0.143)

tie-2 (0.199)
tie-2 (0.199)
tie-2 (0.199)
1 (0.250)

tie - 3 (0.086)
2 (0.098)
tie-3 (0.086)
1 (0.105)

Overall Information
Assurance Score
(max = 1.00)
4(0.618)
2 (0.753)
3 (0.683)
1 (0.910)

Table 4-13 shows that with respect to Information Assurance alone, Cisco Secure
IDS Most Likely outcome dominates all other alternatives. Clearly, Cisco Secure IDS
will provide AMIS with the highest level of information assurance among the alternatives
evaluated, scoring 0.910 out of a possible 1.000. ISS and ESM will each also increase
the current level of information assurance on AMIS, although to a lesser degree than
Cisco Secure IDS.
Figure 4-4 is a graphical representation of Table 4-13. The Best Possible Case is
displayed at the top of Figure 4-4 to illustrate the maximum possible attainable score in
Information and IS Protection, Detection, Reaction, and Overall Information Assurance.
The chart shows Cisco Secure IDS does substantially better than the other alternatives in
Information and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction, resulting in it being the
overwhelming choice for best IA strategy.
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Figure 4-4: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IA - Most Likely Case
However, information assurance is only one part of the Information Assurance
Analysis Model (IAAM). Table 4-14 shows the alternative rankings for the Impact of IA
on System Operational Capability Model, again with the top tier values shown:
Table 4-14: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IOC - Most Likely Case
Alternative

EiTiciency
(max =
0.247)

Functionality
(max = 0.395)

Convenience
(max =
0.247)

Ease of
Implementation
(max = 0.049)

Flexibility
(max =
0.062)

Baseline

tie— 1
(0.148)
4 (0.069)

tie -1 (0.328)

1 (0.127)

1 (0.032)

tie -1 (0.328)

tie-2 (0.022)

3 (0.128)

tie-1(0.328)

tie-3
(0.116)
2(0.122)

tie- 1
(0.148)

4 (0.304)

tie-3
(0.116)

tie-2 (0.022)

tie — 1
(0.062)
tie — 1
(0.062)
tie— 1
(0.062)
tie — 1
(0.062)

ISS Most
Likely
ESM Most
Likely
Cisco
Secure
IDS Most
Likely
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4(0.018)

Overall
IOC Score
(max =
1.00)
1 (0.698)
4 (0.597)
2 (0.658)
3(0.651)

Not surprisingly, the Baseline Case is the preferred alternative when considering the
impact IA strategies will have on system operational capability. Each additional strategy
was measured based on its impact or change to the current state. The Cisco Secure IDS
Most Likely alternative, which was clearly the best alternative with respect to
information assurance alone, scored only slightly lower (0.658 to 0.651) than the ESM
Most Likely Case in overall IRC. Figure 4-5 is a graphical representation of Table 4-14.
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Figure 4-5: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IOC - Most Likely Case

Figure 4-5 shows that Cisco Secure IDS was higher than ESM in Efficiency (by
0.020), slightly lower than ESM in Functionality (by 0.024), and virtually even in
Convenience, Ease of Implementation, and Flexibility.
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Table 4-15 presents the results of the four alternatives with respect to the Impact
of Information Assurance on Resource Costs hierarchy, with the respective rank again
parenthesized:
Table 4-15: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IRC - Most Likely Case
Alternative
Baseline
ISS Most Likely
ESM Most Likely
Cisco Secure IDS
Most Likely

Life Cycle Acquisition
Costs (max = 0.40)
1 (0.333)
tie-2 (0.329)
tie-2 (0.329)
4 (0.327)

Personnel
(max = 0.60)
2 (0.092)
3 (0.078)
1 (0.097)
4 (0.064)

Overall IRC Score
(max = 1.00)
Tie-1(0.425)
3 (0.407)
Tie -1 (0.425)
4(0.391)

The Baseline Case and ESM Most Likely tie as the top alternative with respect to
the Impact of an IA on AFTAC Resource Costs hierarchy. Table 4-15 shows that while
the Baseline is less expensive to maintain (hence the higher value), the ESM Most Likely
alternative requires less personnel. It should be noted that the maximum value possible
for Personnel is 0.600 yet no alternative reached 0.100. This is clearly a value gap in the
set of alternatives. Developing a new alternative that could produce a high score on the
Personnel value would greatly improve the overall IRC score. A graphical representation
of Table 4-15 is given as Figure 4-6:
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Figure 4-6: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IRC - Most Likely Case

Table 4-16 gives a summary of the alternatives and their respective rank within
each hierarchy. No alternative dominated another.
Table 4-16: Summary of Alternative Rankings - Most Likely Case
Alternative
Baseline
ISS Most Likely
ESM Most Likely
Cisco Secure IDS Most
Likely

Information
Assurance Rank
4
2
3
1

IOC Rank

IRC Rank

1
4
2
3

1
3
1
4

Figure 4-7 presents the Most Likely strategy results on the three IAAM
hierarchies. Again note that Cisco Secure IDS is clearly the best alternative with respect
to Information Assurance, however the IOC and IRC hierarchies display a much tighter
range.
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Presented with these alternatives, the decision-maker(s) could now consider the
relative merits of each alternative given their scores in each of the three hierarchies. As
was seen in the preceding analysis, the total measures can be "peeled-back" to any level
of the hierarchy to reveal the sources of the differences. The decision-maker's values can
help clarify differences in the alternatives and allow him or her to use their expertise to
make the final selections. The associated analysis is available to support the decisionmaker's expertise.
A summary of the Most Likely conditions is given as a radar chart in Figure 4-8.
Each axis of the chart represents one of the hierarchies in the IAAM. The higher a
strategy scores in any given hierarchy, the further out its representative line will be on
that specific axis. This chart shows that Cisco Secure IDS is the clear winner in the
Information Assurance hierarchy. The strategies are tightly grouped in both the IRC and
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IRC hierarchies, indicating that the Cisco Secure IDS would not substantially change
system operational capability or consume large amounts of AFTAC resources. It has
been shown, however, that Cisco Secure IDS is slightly outperformed in IOC and IRC.
The decision-maker will need to consider the relative merits of each value when making a
final decision.
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oM
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Figure 4-8: Radar Chart on Most Likely Case Results

4.6 Worst and Best Case Comparisons
While the analysis of the Most Likely Case provided insight, it is important to
consider potential "downside" risk and "upside" gains since the information assurance
strategies may not perform exactly as specified. For this reason, the Internet Security
Scanner, Enterprise Security Manager, and Cisco Secure IDS were also scored on a
Worst Case and a Best Case conditions for each appropriate measure. Any measure that
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AFTAC personnel felt would not vary was left as it was originally scored. A summary of
the results from the Worst and Base Case conditions is presented in the following
sections.
4.6.1 Alternative Comparisons - Worst Case Conditions
The Worst Case conditions for each alternative and the Baseline are summarized
in the following tables. Since AFTAC personnel cannot select whether a strategy
performs as expected, the Worst Case conditions are only compared to one another. The
Baseline Case, which did not change, is provided as a reference. Table 4-17 provides the
score and associated rank for each Worst Case alternative with respect to the Information
Assurance hierarchy, with Information and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction
separated:
Table 4-17: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IA - Worst Case
Alternative

Baseline
ISS Worst Case
ESM Worst Case
Cisco Secure IDS
Worst Case

Information and
IS Protection
(max = 0.571)
4 (0.333)
3 (0.334)
2 (0.336)
1 (0.555)

Detection
(max = 0.286)

Reaction
(max = 0.143)

tie-2 (0.199)
tie-2 (0.199)
tie-2 (0.199)
1 (0.250)

tie-3 (0.086)
2 (0.098)
tie-3 (0.086)
1 (0.105)

Overall Information
Assurance Score
(max = 1.00)
4(0.618)
2(0.631)
3 (0.622)
1 (0.910)

The Cisco Secure IDS Worst Case is the same as its Most Likely Case with respect to
Information Assurance. Since there is no variation for Cisco Secure IDS on IA, and it
was the highest ranked alternative with respect to the Most Likely outcome, it is
guaranteed to produce the highest amount of assurance of any alternative. Figure 4-9 is a
graphical representation of Table 4-17.
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Figure 4-9: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IA - Worst Case

In the Worst Case conditions, ISS and ESM lose substantial value in Information
and IS Protection, while Cisco Secure IDS is able to maintain its Most Likely score.
Table 4-18 summarizes the rankings with respect to the IOC model:
Table 4-18: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IOC - Worst Case
Alternative

Efficiency
(max =
0.247)

Functionality
(max = 0.395)

Convenience
(max =
0.247)

Ease of
Implementation
(max = 0.049)

Flexibility
(max =
0.062)

Baseline

tie— 1
(0.148)
tie-3
(0.049)
tie-3
(0.049)

tie— 1
(0.328)
4 (0.049)

1 (0.127)

1 (0.032)

tie-3
(0.116)
2(0.122)

3 (0.019)

tie- 1
(0.062)
tie— 1
0.062
tie — 1
(0.062)

tie — 1
(0.148)

2 (0.304)

ISS Worst
Case
ESM
Worst
Case
Cisco
Secure
IDS Worst
Case

tie -1 (0.328)

tie-3
(0.116)

4 (0.010)

2 (0.020)

tie-1
(0.062)

Overall
IOC Score
(max =
1.00)
1 (0.698)
4 (0.295)
3 (0.570)

2 (0.650)

Table 4-18 shows that if the Worst Case conditions occurred for every alternative, Cisco
Secure IDS would improve to second best behind only the Baseline Case. If the Worst
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Case occurred for ISS, AFATC would experience a severe loss in system operational
capability. Figure 4-10 is a graphical representation of Table 4-18:
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Figure 4-10: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IOC - Worst Case

ISS scores significantly lower in the IOC Worst Case conditions than ESM and
Cisco Secure IDS, which implies there is a chance ISS could have a negative impact on
system operational capability. The final hierarchy in the IAAM model, the Impact of
Information Assurance on Resource Costs, is summarized as Table 4-19:
Table 4-19: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IRC - Worst Case
Alternative
Baseline
ISS Worst Case
ESM Worst Case
Cisco Secure IDS
Worst Case

Personnel
(max = 0.60)
2 (0.092)
3 (0.065)
1 (0.097)
4(0.061)

Life Cycle Acquisition
Costs (max = 0.40)
1 (0.333)
tie-3 (0.324)
tie - 3 (0.324)
2 (0.327)
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Overall IRC Score
(max = 1.00)
1 (0.425)
3 (0.389)
2 (0.421)
4 (0.388)

The Baseline Case edges ESM for the highest value in the IRC model, although as
previously mentioned, differences this small may not be material. As a whole, the
alternatives are grouped fairly tightly. This is due primarily because their collective low
implementation and maintenance costs made the value 'Life Cycle Acquisition Costs'
almost irrelevant to these alternatives. Figure 4-11 is a graphical representation of Table
4-19 presented above.
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Figure 4-11: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IRC - Worst Case

Clearly, Figure 4-11 shows that the Personnel value gap still exists in the Worst Case
conditions since all strategies still score very low in this measure. A maximum score of
0.600 may be earned in Personnel, however the highest ranked alternative in Personnel,
ESM, scores only a 0.097.
Table 4-20 summarizes the Worst Case conditions alternative's respective rank
within each hierarchy:

96

Table 4-20: Worst Case Conditions Alternative Rankings
Alternative
Baseline
ISS Most Likely
ESM Most Likely
Cisco Secure IDS Most
Likely

Information
Assurance Rank
4
2
3
1

IOC Rank

IRC Rank

1
4
3
2

1
3
2
3

Figure 4-12 shows each strategy's respective score in the IA, IOC, and IRC hierarchies
for the Worst Case conditions. Notice that there is more variation in the IOC hierarchy
than there was in the Most Likely Case due to the low score of ISS.

Baseline Case
■ ISS Worst Case
□ ESM Worst Case
0 426

Overall Information
Assurance

Overall IOC

0-421

0 389

0 388

rjCisco Secure IDS
Worst Case

Overall IRC

IAAM Hierarchy

Figure 4-12: Worst Case Results, Separated by IAAM Hierarchy

The strategies separate in the IA and IOC hierarchies in the Worst Case
conditions. Since Cisco Secure IDS had no variation with respect to IA in the Worst
Case conditions, it kept its original score of 0.910. Cisco Secure IDS greatly
outperformed the other strategies in the IA hierarchy Worst Case conditions since they all
scored substantially lower than they did in the Most Likely Case. ISS has larger
"downside" risk in the IOC hierarchy, implying that AFTAC personnel believe there is a
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possibility it could materially impact system operational capability if implementation
were to go worse than expected.
4.6.2 Alternative Comparisons - Best Case
The Best Case conditions were scored to capture benefits of the strategy that were
not initially considered or were uncertain to AFTAC personnel. Again, not all measures
were believed to vary. Table 4-21 summarizes the Best Case conditions ranking for each
alternative and the Baseline Case, which is unchanged:
Table 4-21: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IA - Best Case
Alternative

Baseline
ISS Best Case
ESM Best Case
Cisco Secure IDS
Best Case

Information and
IS Protection
(max = 0.571)
4 (0.333)
1 (0.560)
3 (0.465)
2 (0.557)

Detection
(max = 0.286)

Reaction
(max = 0.143)

tie-2 (0.199)
tie-2 (0.199)
tie-2 (0.199)
1 (0.250)

tie-3 (0.086)
2 (0.098)
tie-3 (0.086)
1 (0.109)

Overall Information
Assurance Score
(max = 1.00)
4(0.618)
2 (0.857)
3 (0.750)
1 (0.915)

The Cisco Secure IDS is again the highest ranked alternative within the Best Case
conditions, scoring 91.5% of the total possible. While the relative improvement is small
from Cisco Secure IDS's Most Likely score (a gain of 0.005), when added to the current
AMIS configuration it nonetheless provides the best score on the Best Case conditions.
In the Best Case, all alternatives separated themselves from the Baseline Case, improving
their respective scores from the Most Likely Case. Figure 4-13 is a graphical
representation of Table 4-21.
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Figure 4-13: Alternative Comparisons with respect to Information Assurance - Best Case

In the Best Case, ISS actually performs better than Cisco Secure IDS in Information and
IS Protection. This high score also propelled ISS to a high overall score, but still not high
enough to overcome Cisco Secure IDS, which scored well throughout the hierarchy.
Table 4-22 details the rankings of the Best Case conditions alternatives with
respect to the Impact of IA on System Operational Capability hierarchy:
Table 4-22: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to Impact of IOC - Best Case
Alternative

Efficiency
(max =
0.247)

Functionality
(max = 0.395)

Convenience
(max =
0.247)

Ease of
Implementation
(max = 0.049)

Flexibility
(max =
0.062)

Baseline

tie— 1
(0.148)
4 (0.069)

3 (0.328)

tie— 1
(0.127)
tie-3
(0.122)
tie — 1
(0.127)
tie-3
(0.122)

1 (0.032)

tie - 1
(0.062)
tie- 1
(0.062)
tie- 1
(0.062)
tie- 1
(0.062)

ISS Best
Case
ESM Best
Case
Cisco
Secure
IDS Best
Case

tie — 1
(0.148)
tie — 1
(0.148)

2 (0.340)
1 (0.353)
4 (0.304)
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tie-3 (0.023)
2(0.031)
tie-3 (0.023)

Overall
IOC Score
(max =
1.00)
2 (0.698)
4 (0.616)
1 (0.721)
3 (0.658)

The ESM Best Case conditions actually improve system operational capability as it
received a higher score than the Baseline Case. This is the only alternative and condition
set within any of the analyses to actually improve IA and operational capability on the
system. The Cisco Secure IDS, which was the clear winner in the IA hierarchy, ranks
slightly behind the Baseline Case by only 0.04. A graphical representation is given in
Figure 4-14.
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Figure 4-14: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IOC - Best Case

In the Best Case, ESM scores strongly in Functionality, which is the reason it
ranks ahead of the Baseline Case in IOC. Cisco Secure IDS received the same scores for
all values in the IOC hierarchy as did ESM, save Functionality. Cisco Secure IDS scored
only a 0.304 in Functionality, a relatively low score compared to ESM and ISS. Table 423 shows the Best Case alternative rankings for the IRC hierarchy:
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Table 4-23: Alternative Rankings and Scores with respect to IRC - Best Case
Alternative
Baseline
ISS Best Case
ESM Best Case
Cisco Secure IDS
Best Case

Life Cycle Acquisition
Costs (max = 0.40)
1 (0.333)
2 (0.330)
3 (0.329)
4 (0.327)

Personnel
(max = 0.60)
2 (0.092)
3 (0.078)
1 (0.101)
4 (0.064)

Overall IRC Score
(max = 1.00)
2 (0.425)
3 (0.408)
1 (0.430)
4(0.391)

The ESM Best Case conditions again ranks higher than the Baseline Case with respect to
the IRC hierarchy. Combined with the knowledge from the previous table, ESM Best
Case can improve IA (although not the level of Cisco Secure IDS), increase operational
capability, and consume less resource costs than the current system. It is important to
note, however, that this is under Best Case conditions and should be considered as the
upper limit of a strategy's potential. Figure 4-15 is a graphical representation of Table 423.
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Figure 4-15: Alternative Comparisons with respect to IRC - Best Case

ESM scores higher than any other alternative in Personnel, causing it to be the
highest ranked strategy in IRC for the Best Case conditions since there was little variation
in the Life Cycle Acquisition Costs scores. It is important to note that even on Best Case
conditions, a value gap in Personnel still exists. ESM's relatively high score of 0.101 in
Personnel is still far from the best possible score of 0.600. Table 4-24 summarizes the
alternatives' respective ranking within each hierarchy for the Best Case conditions. ESM
dominated the Baseline Case on the Best Case conditions as it ranks higher in all three
hierarchies.
Table 4-24: Summary of Best Case Alternative Rankings
Alternative
Baseline
ISS Most Likely
ESM Most Likely
Cisco Secure IDS Most
Likely

Information
Assurance Rank
4
2
3
1
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IOC Rank

IRC Rank

2
4
1
3

2
3
1
4

Figure 4-16 shows the Best Case conditions results for each of the strategies. ISS, ESM,
and Cisco Secure IDS all score substantially higher in the IA hierarchy. ESM scores
higher than the Baseline Case in the IA, IOC, and IRC hierarchies, indicating that it
provides increased information assurance, increased system operational capability, and
will consume less AFTAC resources than the Baseline Case

gjBaseline Case
■ ISS Best Case
□ ESM Best Case
□ Cisco Secure
IDS Best Case

Overall Information
Assurance

Overall IOC

Overall IRC

IAAM Hierarchy

Figure 4-16: Best Case Results, Separated by IAAM Hierarchy

Figure 4-17, Figure 4-18, and Figure 4-19 show the range of each strategy with respect to
the IA, IOC, and IRC hierarchies. Figure 4-17 shows that the Worst Case conditions for
Cisco Secure IDS receives a higher score than the Best Case for all other alternatives.
This implies that Cisco Secure IDS is clearly the best strategy with respect to the IA
hierarchy alone, dominating all other alternatives.
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Figure 4-18 depicts the Worst, Most Likely, and Best Case conditions for the IOC
hierarchy. There is no single strategy that completely dominates the IOC hierarchy. For
the Best Case conditions, ESM is the highest ranked alternative; however, for the Worst
Case conditions it ranks below the Baseline Case and Cisco Secure IDS. ESM
unfortunately has a wide range between its Best and Worst Case scores. ISS also exhibits
a large range in the IOC hierarchy, indicating that there is uncertainty with this strategy's
impact to system operational capability. Cisco Secure IDS exhibited the least variation in
the IOC hierarchy, ranging from a Worst Case of 0.650 to a Best Case of 0.658.
Although this is a decrease from the baseline IOC score of 0.689, Cisco Secure IDS does
not appear to have a substantial "downside" risk.
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Figure 4-19 also shows that there is no guaranteed best alternative in the IRC
hierarchy. While ESM Best Case edges the Baseline Case for the highest ranked
alternative, it does not score higher in the Worst Case. ISS and Cisco Secure IDS are
clearly the third and fourth ranked strategies with respect to IRC, however their ordering
cannot be guaranteed due to having a slight overlap. Again, Cisco Secure IDS exhibited
the least variation, however its Most Likely IRC score was lower than that of the Baseline
Case, ISS, and ESM.

105

0.440

M3fl_

0.430

0.426

0.425
— 0.424-

0.420
0.4080.407

0.410
a
o 0.400
o

♦ IRC Worst Case
0.39'

CO

4v3S*MMmmmmmm i,

0.390

»fsilllilliti

■

0.39
0.38 t

«IRC Most Likely
A IRC Best Case

0.380
0.370

■—

l»i

:

'rt*/l#l»SSiSÄfPIS
0.360
Baseline

ISS

ESM

Cisco Secure
IDS

Strategy

Figure 4-19: Strategy Range with respect to IRC

4.7 Weight Sensitivity Analysis
The total value for each alternative depends on the weights given to each
measure; therefore a sensitivity analysis based on the weighting was performed to
determine if and when the rank order of the alternatives changed. A sensitivity analysis
on the weighting of the top-tier values for each of the three hierarchies for the Most
Likely Case will be presented in this chapter. A sensitivity analysis on all other values
and individual measures for the Best, Worst, and Most Likely Case was also performed
but is not presented in this document. The vast majority of lower tier values were
insensitive to weight changes at the local level.
One-way sensitivity analyses were performed for each value. The Microsoft
Excel © spreadsheet used to generate the one-way sensitivity analysis in this report does
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have the ability to produce two or three-way sensitivity analysis should that be desired,
although additional programming is required.
The sensitivity analysis will show if altering any weights would change the
overall ranking of the alternatives in the given hierarchy. All sensitivity analyses are
one-way, meaning that only one value at a time was varied independently. All other
values at the same tier of the hierarchy kept their respective proportional weight ratios.
For example, when performing a sensitivity analysis on the top tier values of the IA
hierarchy, which are Information and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction, only one
value at a time was varied from 0.000 to 1.000 (at increments of 0.100) while the other
two values held their original weight ratios. The local weights for Information and IS
Protection originally were 4 / 7 (= 0.571), 2 / 7 (= 0.286), and 1 / 7 (= 0.143) respectively.
As the weight for Information and IS Protection was varied, all three weights were still
forced to sum to 1.000.
The formula used to determine the weights for the dependant values, Detection
and Reaction, are given as Equation 4-1 and Equation 4-2 respectively, where wp =
Information and IS Protection weight, w<i = Detection weight, Wd° = Original Detection
weight, wr = Reaction weight, and wr° = Original Reaction weight:
Wd = (1 - wp) x [wd° / (wd° + wr0)]
Equation 4-1: Formula to calculate Detection while varying Information and IS Protection [modified from
Kirkwood, 1997: 82]
Wr = (1 - Wp) X [Wr° / (Wr° + Wd°)]
Equation 4-2: Formula to calculate Reaction while varying Information and IS Protection [modified from
Kirkwood, 1997: 82]
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Table 4-25 shows the respective weights for Information and IS Protection,
Detection, and Reaction as Information and IS Protection is varied from 0.000 to 1.000
(original weights in bold):
Table 4-25: Weights as Information and IS Protection is varied from 0.000 to 1.000
Value
Information
and IS
Protection

Weight
0.000

0.100

0.200

0.300

0.400

0.500

0.571

0.600

0.700

0.800

0.900

1.000

Detection

0.667

0.600

0.533

0.467

0.400

0.333

0.286

0.267

0.200

0.133

0.067

0.000

Reaction

0.333

0.300

0.267

0.233

0.200

0.167

0.143

0.133

0.100

0.067

0.033

0.000

Detection was then varied at increments of 0.100 holding Information and IS
Protection and Reaction to their original comparative weight ratios. Table 4-26 presents
the weights for Information and IS Protection, Detection, and Reaction as Detection was
varied (original weights in bold):
Table 4-26: Weights as Detection is varied from 0.000 to 1.000
Value
Detection
Information
and IS
Protection
Reaction

0.000

0.100

0.200

0.286

0.300

Weight
0.400
0.500

0.600

0.700

0.800

0.900

1.000

0.800

0.720

0.640

0.571

0.560

0.480

0.400

0.320

0.240

0.160

0.080

0.000

0.200

0.180

0.160

0.143

0.140

0.120

0.100

0.080

0.060

0.040

0.020

0.000

Finally, Reaction was varied in the same fashion as the previous two values;
Table 4-27 gives their respective weights (original weights in bold):
Table 4-27: Weights as Reaction is varied from 0.000 to 1.000
Value
Reaction
Information
and IS
Protection
Detection

0.000

0.100

0.143

0.200

0.300

Weight
0.400
0.500

0.600

0.700

0.800

0.900

1.000

0.667

0.600

0.571

0.533

0.467

0.400

0.333

0.267

0.200

0.133

0.067

0.000

0.333

0.300

0.286

0.267

0.233

0.200

0.167

0.133

0.100

0.067

0.033

0.000

The sensitivity analysis follows this procedure for all values within a hierarchical tier.
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4.7.1 Information Assurance Sensitivity
AFTAC Experts originally gave Information and IS Protection a local weight of
4/7, or about 0.571. With this weight, Cisco Secure IDS was clearly the highest ranked
strategy, receiving an IA score of 0.910. Figure 4-20 shows how the alternatives rank
when the local weight for Information and IS Protection is varied between 0.0 and 1.0 in
increment of 0.1. The vertical line shows the original local weight.
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Figure 4-20: Information and IS Protection Sensitivity Analysis

Figure 4-20 shows that as Information and IS Protection's weight varies from 0.0
to 1.0, Cisco Secure IDS remains the highest ranked strategy for IA. The separation at an
Information and IS Protection weight of 1.0 implies that Cisco Secure IDS scored
extremely well in relation to this value.
Detection, which originally received a local weight of 2/7, or approximately
0.286, was also varied between 0.0 and 1.0 in increments of 0.1. Figure 4-21 presents the
sensitivity analysis for Detection:
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Detection Sensitivity Analysis (Most Likely Case)
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Figure 4-21: Detection Sensitivity Analysis

Again, Cisco Secure IDS is the highest ranked alternative across the entire weight
spectrum. It is interesting to note that as Detection nears a local weight of 1.0, all other
alternatives converge to the same overall IA score. This would imply that they all scored
very similar in Detection measures.
Figure 4-22 shows the sensitivity analysis for Reaction, which originally received
a local weight of 1/7, or about 0.143.
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Reaction Sensitivity Analysis (Worst Case)
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Figure 4-22: Reaction Sensitivity Analysis

Although the overall IA score for Cisco Secure IDS decreases as its local weight
approaches 1.0, it still remains the highest ranked strategy. It is important to note that the
difference between Cisco Secure IDS and ISS becomes very small if Reaction is
weighted 1.0. Clearly, the ranking of these three alternatives is insensitive to the
weighting of the IA hierarchy. At the top level of the IA hierarchy, the highest ranked
strategy with the original weights, Cisco Secure IDS, remains the highest ranked strategy
regardless of any Information and IS Protection, Detection, or Reaction weight.
4.7.2

Operational Capability Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis on the top tier values in the IOC hierarchy was performed to

determine if and where alternative changed rank order due to changing weights. Recall
that Efficiency, Functionality, Convenience, Ease of Implementation, and Flexibility
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compose the top tier of the IOC model. The sensitivity analysis for Efficiency, which
was originally weighted as 5/20.25 (about 0.247) is given in Figure 4-23:
Efficiency Sensitivity Analysis (Most Likely Case)
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Figure 4-23: Efficiency Sensitivity Analysis

The Baseline Case, the current AMIS configuration, remains the highest ranked
alternative in the IOC hierarchy until Efficiency receives a weight of 1.0, where it then
meets with Cisco Secure IDS. Notice the rapid decline of the ISS strategy, implying that
it scored low in Efficiency and as Efficiency becomes more important, the strategy does
quite poorly.
AFTAC experts originally weighted Functionality at 8/20.25, or 0.395. The
sensitivity analysis for Functionality is shown in Figure 4-24:
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Functionality Sensitivity Analysis (Most Likely Case)
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Figure 4-24: Functionality Sensitivity Analysis

The Baseline Case is the highest ranked alternative until Functionality reaches a weight
of 0.9, where it then converges with ISS and ESM. The Cisco Secure IDS was the
second best alternative when Functionality was weighted below 0.2, but was overtaken
by ESM afterwards and eventually became the lowest ranked strategy.
Convenience originally received a weight of 5/20.25, or approximately 0.247.
Figure 4-25 displays the sensitivity analysis for Convenience as it varied form a weight of
0.0 to 1.0:
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Convenience Sensitivity Analysis (Most Likely Case)
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Figure 4-25: Convenience Sensitivity Analysis

All strategies remain close to each other throughout the weight spectrum, converging
tightly when Convenience is weighted a 1.0. The Baseline Case does remain the highest
ranked alternative throughout.
Ease of Implementation Sensitivity Analysis (Most Likely Case)
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Figure 4-26: Ease of Implementation Sensitivity Analysis

Figure 4-26 presents the sensitivity analysis for Ease of Implementation, which
originally received a weight of 1/20.25, or 0.049. The Baseline Case remains the best in
Ease of Implementation, which makes intuitive sense since it is already implemented.
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Therefore, as the weight for Ease of Implementation approaches 1.0, it separates itself
even further from the rest of the strategies. Depending on the exact weight of Ease of
Implementation, the rank order of ISS, ESM, and Cisco Secure IDS switch, with each
being the second, third or fourth ranked alternative. From a weight of 0.0-0.2, ESM and
Cisco are ranked ahead of ISS. At 0.2, Cisco's score decreases faster than ESM's,
leaving ESM the highest ranked strategy until it converges with ISS at 0.7.
Flexibility originally received a weight of 1.25/20.25 (about 0.062) in the IOC
hierarchy. Figure 4-27 shows the sensitivity for Flexibility as its weight is varied from
0.0 to 1.0:
Flexibility Sensitivity Analysis
(Most Likely Case)

- Baseline Case
Internet Security Scanner (ISS)
Most Likely Case
-Enterprise Security Manager
(ESM) Most Likely Case
T-'

T ' ' "T

0 0.06 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

1

-Cisco Secure IDS Most Likely
Case

Flexibility Weight

Figure 4-27: Flexibility Sensitivity Analysis

Every strategy received a perfect score for Flexibility since all were determined to be
Upgradeable and Expandable. Therefore, if Flexibility were to have a weight of 1.0, all
alternatives would receive a perfect IOC score, which is exactly what Figure 4-27
illustrates.
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4.7.3 Impact of IA on Resource Costs Sensitivity Analysis
The IRC hierarchy had two values in its top tier: Life Cycle Acquisition Costs and
Personnel. As with the other hierarchies, each of these was varied between 0.0 and 1.0 in
increments of 0.1 in order to determine if any alternative rankings change depending on
their respective weights. Again, recall that this analysis can be performed at any tier of
the hierarchy.
Figure 4-28 displays the sensitivity analysis for Life Cycle Acquisition Costs,
which was originally weighted as 0.4:
Life Cycle Acquisition Costs Sensitivity Analysis
(Most Likely Case)
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Figure 4-28: Life Cycle Acquisition Costs Sensitivity Analysis

Since all alternatives are relatively inexpensive to AFTAC, the strategies are insensitive.
The Baseline Case is the least expensive and is slightly better than the other three
alternatives throughout the hierarchy. An alternative that was very expensive to install
and maintain would have had a much flatter slope on the graph than the current
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alternatives. The reason that the slope is so steep in Figure 4-28 is due to the weaker
performance of all the alternatives in Personnel.
AFTAC experts weighted Personnel at 0.6 since they determined it was somewhat
more valuable than dollar cost. Figure 4-29 shows the sensitivity analysis for Personnel:
Personnel Sensitivity Analysis
(Most Likely Case)
.Baseline Case
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Figure 4-29: Personnel Sensitivity Analysis

Again, all strategies scored approximately the same, which produces little sensitivity to
weighting. The steep negative slope for each alternative shows that all scored equally
low in 'Personnel.' When its weight approaches 1.0, meaning it is the sole measure for
the IRC hierarchy, the value produced to AFTAC is minimal.
Given the small number of alternatives analyzed, it is not surprising that they
were relatively insensitive to the weighting, especially in the IA and IRC hierarchies.
The IOC hierarchy had five top tier values, with very different original weights, and
therefore was more sensitive to major weight changes than the IA or IRD hierarchy. As
was stated earlier, this weight insensitivity occurred throughout the hierarchy.
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4.8 Conclusions
The Information Assurance Analysis Model, developed in cooperation with
experts from the Air Force Technical Applications Center, was used to analyze the
current level of IA and the impact three different alternatives could have on an
operational system. The alternatives were analyzed as the Most Likely Case, the Worst
Case, and the Best Case since AFTAC personnel were asked to make predictions on their
performance and could not give an accurate point estimate for some measures. A
sensitivity analysis was then conducted to show how the alternatives would have ranked
had personnel weighted values differently. This illustrative analysis demonstrates the
type of insight that the decision-makers at AFTAC can gain when utilizing the IAAM to
evaluate information assurance alternatives. A robust set of measures and analyses were
presented to demonstrate the range of support that can be provided to the decision-maker.
IAAM cannot only calibrate the current level of information assurance, it can also aid in
the analysis of IA alternatives.
Chapter 5 is a summary of the project and will discuss such topics as lessons
learned, opportunities for future work, and general impressions drawn from the project.
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5. Project Conclusions

The objective of this thesis project was to provide a Department of Defense
organization with a quantitative tool to measure and improve their level of information
assurance. The Information Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM), composed of the
Information Assurance (IA), Impact of IA on System Operational Capability (IOC), and
Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC) value hierarchies, was created in order to meet the
stated objective. Built in cooperation with AFTAC information assurance and
information systems experts, the IAAM represents information assurance needs both
specific to AFTAC (represented in the hierarchy weights), and to the DoD as a whole
(represented in hierarchy values). The model provides decision-makers with the insight
to aid in making the difficult and complex decisions regarding the delicate balance
between information assurance, system operational capability, and resource costs.

5.1 Summary of Previous Chapters
The first Chapter of this thesis discussed the beginnings of the Internet and the
inherent risks associated with it. The freedom of open communication afforded by the
Internet revolutionized the speed in which decision-makers could gather, process, and
disseminate information. However, the Internet was not originally designed to serve the
world's population and security problems arose almost immediately after its creation.
Today, the United States and its military depend heavily on interconnected information
systems for their everyday operations and therefore need to insure the information
contained is protected. Information assurance is critical to the safety and well being of
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America, for one well planned and executed attack on a sensitive U. S. information
system could cause catastrophic results.
A literature review detailing the Department of Defense's (DoD) position on
information assurance was presented in the beginning of Chapter 2 to illustrate the
importance it plays in today's military environment. Literature detailing civilian sector
IA concerns was also discussed to show that information assurance must be a community
wide effort. Although both the military and civilian sectors pronounced the need for
solid information assurance strategies, to date there have been few attempts to measure it
available in the public literature. It was then determined that Value Focused Thinking
(VFT) provided a solid theoretical framework for the problem of measuring information
assurance. Chapter 2 concluded with a review of the earlier efforts to model information
assurance with VFT, none of which had been operationally tested. This thesis built upon
the knowledge of DoD doctrine, information assurance literature, and past IA models to
develop, in cooperation with the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), an
operational Information Assurance Analysis Model (IAAM) that would be tested on their
AFTAC Mission Information System (AMIS).
Working with information assurance experts at AFTAC, it was verified that the
IAAM should contain three separate hierarchies: Information Assurance, the Impact of
Information Assurance on System Operational Capability, and the Impact of Information
Assurance on Resource Costs. The development of these three hierarchies using the VFT
process, which included creating values and their associated measures and weights, was
reviewed in Chapter 3 and presented in detail in the Appendix. The contributions of
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AFTAC personnel above and beyond their required duty allowed this project to become a
reality. They cannot be given enough thanks for their time and effort.
AFTAC personnel proposed three separate information assurance strategies that
they were considering for implementation into AMIS. These alternatives, along with the
current AMIS system, were analyzed using the model. The result of this study, along
with a sensitivity analysis on the value weights, is presented as Chapter 4.
The Appendix is a detailed review of the hierarchies, to include value definitions
and rationale, as well as measure functions. Additionally, a Microsoft Excel ©
spreadsheet tool was created to help analyze the model and its results. The spreadsheet
has the ability to insert and delete measures as deemed necessary to accommodate
evolving assurance requirements and needs.

5.2 Project Objectives
As stated, the goal of this thesis was to provide a model that could be used by
military or civilian organizations to help improve their information assurance. However,
the model must be focused to capture specific necessities of the organization using it.
Therefore, the IAAM was created with the intention that it could be used by a variety of
organizations by building in the capability to be fined-tuned to fit each specific
organization's unique needs.
Ultimately, the IAAM should be able to be used without VFT expert assistance;
nevertheless, if the model is used incorrectly, it could lead to mistakes and thus the
utmost care should be made when using the model to make decisions. The IAAM as it
currently exists should therefore be used in cooperation with a VFT expert. It should be
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noted, however, the AFTAC personnel who participated in the model development
exhibited a great deal of understanding of VFT as the project progressed.
The IAAM met the project objectives for both the AFIT and the AFTAC focus.
Senior leadership at AFTAC have expressed an interest in implementing the IAAM into
their information assurance decision-making process.

5.3 Future Research
Information assurance will remain a problem as long as people desire another's
information. Therefore, this work must continue to evolve with computer technology it is
designed to protect. While the values for this model are likely to remain for a period of
time, it is unlikely that any assurance model that remains static will remain effective.
Technology evolves quickly; what is great today will only be good tomorrow, and what is
good today may be useless tomorrow. The IAAM model was designed to be an
operational information analysis tool. Emphasis was placed on creating a model that
would provide insight to decision-makers. Future research should therefore continue to
focus on improving the insight gained from using this tool.
It would be advantageous to apply this model to other systems at AFTAC that are
of a higher classification to see which adjustments might be required. Again, this model
does not necessarily have to remain in its present form to be beneficial to an organization.
Weighting does provide the flexibility to re-focus the model. However, if a uniquely
different system does require adjustments beyond mere re-weighting, the existing
hierarchies and measures provide a starting framework for future efforts.
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This model did try to capture some uncertainty by analyzing the Most Likely,
Worst, and Best Case conditions for the alternatives. However, a probabilistic risk
assessment was not incorporated beyond the Best and Worst Case conditions mentioned.
Utility theory accounts for decision-maker risk tolerance by assessing the probability of
different events occurring, and if used properly will provide the decision-maker with a
tool specifically tailored to that person's preferences. The incorporation of risk is clearly
an additional possibility.
As personnel become more familiar with the IAAM and its uses, it can be utilized
in conjunction with other analysis techniques. A further extension might be constructing
an optimization to select the correct portfolios maximizing the fundamental value score.
A linear program used in conjunction with VFT principles would combine the two
techniques to provide a model with even greater precision. For example, personnel could
use VFT to generate value hierarchies representing what was important the organization's
information assurance as was done in this thesis. The linear program would then
multiply the value coefficient by the alternative's score, producing an overall information
assurance total.

5.4 Conclusions
The Information Assurance Analysis Model is one step towards solving the
information assurance dilemma. Decision-makers will continue to struggle to achieve a
balance between information assurance, system operational capability, and resource
costs. The work presented in this thesis provides organizations with a quantitative tool to
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help find the balance between these competing values in order to improve their mission
effectiveness.
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Appendix. Value Hierarchies and Associated Measure Functions

The objective of this project was to develop a model to measure and improve
Information Assurance (I A) at AFTAC using the process of Value Focused Thinking
(VFT). The system chosen for study was the AFT AC Mission Information System
(AMIS). AMIS carries a SECRET classification, therefore it stores and processes
valuable information that requires protection. Joint Doctrine defines Information
Assurance to be:
Information Operations (10) that protect and defend information systems
(IS) by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality,
and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities
[JP 3-13, 1998:1-9].
Improving IA may impact the System Operational Capability (IOC) and AFTAC
Resource Costs (IRC); consequently these considerations must also be included in the
model. Figure A-l shows the relationship between IA, IOC, and IRC. A best case
scenario would be one that increases information assurance, positively impacts system
operational capability, and implements the changes at a low cost to AFTAC.
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Figure A-l: Relationship between Information Assurance (IA), Impact of IA on System Operational
Capability (IOC), and Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC) [modified from Hamill, 2000: 4-2]

In order to capture the three key factors, the Information Assurance Analysis
Model (IAAM) has been constructed as shown in Figure A-2. There are three main
hierarchies in the model: Information Assurance (IA), Impact of IA on System
Operational Capability (IOC), and Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC).
Information Assurance Analysis
Model (IAAM)
^A-""""^

Information Assurance
(IA)

ir

Impact of IA on System
Operational Capability (IOC)

^"""""--A.

Impact of IA on Resource
Costs (IRC)

Figure A-2: The Information Assurance Analysis Model

The three hierarchies are used to find a balance between these competing factors in
order to provide the best balance of assurance and system capability at the lowest cost.
The current level of IA at AFTAC was baselined in order to provide a frame of reference
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for this study. This allowed value gaps, defined to be areas where improvement can be
gained, to be identified on AMIS. Several different IA strategies were then proposed,
scored, and rank ordered using the model. Combined, this information provided valuable
insight that AFTAC decision-makers can use to determine which IA strategies should be
selected for implementation.
The Information Assurance (IA) hierarchy is first discussed, followed by the Impact
of IA on System Operational Capability (IOC) hierarchy, and finally the Impact of IA on
Resource Costs (IRC) hierarchy. The IA hierarchy contains values associated with
measuring what AFTAC personnel determined to be important regarding the information
assurance on AMIS. The IOC hierarchy measures the change in operational capability an
IA strategy is projected to have upon the system, not the actual system operational
capability. Likewise, the IRC hierarchy measures the impact an IA strategy will have on
AFTAC resource costs, and is not a measure of AFTAC s overall resources.
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Information Assurance
The first step in the VFT process is to identify what values system experts feel are
important to each of the three hierarchies. Beginning with the IA hierarchy, a definition
of each value, the rationale behind it, and an explanation of the single dimensional value
functions used to measure the value will be presented. The full IA hierarchy is shown as
Figure A-3:
Information Assurance

Information and IS Protection

Detection

Reaction

Respond

Timely

X
Physical

Electronic

Physical
External

Integrity

Electronic
External
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Focused

Flexible
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Verify

Restore

Compliance

1

1
Ability to
Detect Event

1
Ability Accurately
Categorize Event

Timely

Accurately

Adapt /Learn

Flexibility

Figure A-3: Information Assurance (IA) Value Hierarchy

The IA hierarchy is separated into three main sub-hierarchies: Information and
Information Systems (IS) Protection, Detection, and Reaction. These values were taken
from the JP 3-13 definition of IA given on the first page of this document. When
presented to AFTAC information assurance specialists, they concurred that an IA value
hierarchy must capture all the elements of protection, detection, and reaction in order to
be a complete model. It is important to note that information assurance is not a synonym
for computer security; IA is the entire process of defending valuable information.
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Information and Information Systems (IS) Protection will be discussed first
followed by Detection and Reaction. The value hierarchy is a representation of AFTAC
values and should not to be read as a flow chart. Like an organizational chart, the
ordering of the values at any given level is not significant. The hierarchy could read
Reaction, Detection, and Protection from left to right and not disturb the model. The
weights placed on each value, which are discussed in Chapter 3, signify the importance of
that particular value.
Information and Information Systems (IS) Protection

Information Assurance
(IA)

1
Information and IS Protection

-

Detection

Reaction

Availability

- Confidentiality
Integrity
Compliance
Figure A-4: Information and Information Systems (IS) Protection

Information and Information Systems (IS) Protection; Measures taken to protect
information and information systems. An event is defined as any abnormal activity that
occurs to the system that could compromise information. Malicious attacks by terrorists
or an AFTAC employee accidentally accessing restricted information are both considered
events.
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Rationale: Protection is a key consideration of any IA strategy. It includes both
electronic protection, physical security measures, and policies that prevent unauthorized
personnel from accessing information. Protection is critical because it is responsible for
preventing events before they ever occur; it is impossible for a foe to corrupt information
if unauthorized access cannot be attained. It is important to note that protection, in this
hierarchy, includes both information and information systems; therefore protection
against both electronic and physical attacks are considered.
Information and IS Protection is a very broad term requiring further definition.
Using both joint doctrine and AFT AC experts, Information and IS Protection was
separated into Availability, Confidentiality, Integrity, and Compliance. The discussion
begins with the uppermost value in the hierarchy and progresses downward until all
values are covered; this pattern is followed throughout the appendix. Recall that the
position of a value within any individual tier does not reflect its level of importance.
Availability: The system is available to authorized
personnel when needed.
Rationale: Availability is important because
authorized users and system administrators must be

% Of System Uptime (E-mail)

able to utilize the system in order to perform their

% Of System Uptime (Print)

missions. Availability is a product of good

% Of System Uptime (File)

protection; a properly protected system will be

% Of System Uptime (Internet)

available to authorized personnel when they need it.
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Measure: Availability is measured as the percentage of system uptime for both users and
support personnel. Since the system may perform more than one function, and these
functions may be available independently from one another (for example, e-mail may be
available when the print server is not) there are separate measures for each critical system
function. AMIS, the system under study, has four primary services (e-mail, print, file,
and Internet); therefore there are four separate value functions. Each service was
weighted separately, reflecting the different levels of importance between the services.
Taken independently, AFTAC values each of the services in the same pattern, so the
shape of the value function is constant for all four system functions. The graphs in
Figure A-5 through Figure A-8 show that no value is given until the servers are available
for at least 80% of the time. Anything below this 80% Availability point is unacceptable
to the organization. There is a sharp rise in value from 90% to 95% availability because
the agency feels that anything less than 95% availability would severely hamper mission
capabilities.

Figure A-5: Percentage of System Uptime (E-mail)
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Figure A-6: Percentage of System Uptime (Print)

Figure A-7: Percentage of System Uptime (File)
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Confidentiality: Unauthorized people do not have
Information and IS Protection

access to restricted information.
Rationale: While Availability considers if system

Aviiilahilitv

functions are operational, Confidentiality captures

Confidentiality
Change in System
Confidentiality

whether or not the user is authorized to access the
information. It is important that unauthorized people
do not gain access to information they should not

Iutegrity

Compliance

have. A system that was available 99% of the time
to anyone with Internet access would score high in Availability, but it would have no
confidentiality. Confidentiality considers both insider access and outsider access. For
example, a user with a secret classification should not be able to access a top-secret
information system; Confidentiality, as measured here, is therefore independent of who is
trying to gain unauthorized access to restricted information.
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Measure: Confidentiality is measured by determining what change an IA strategy will
have on existing confidentiality. This is done for two reasons: only known
confidentiality breaches can be measured (if a breach in confidentiality occurs and is not
detected then there is no way of measuring it), and system Confidentiality is not a
vulnerability that an organization would necessarily want to disclose. Additionally,
confidentiality is rarely constant across a time period. Usually several events will occur
that jeopardize confidentiality within a very short time period, which is then followed by
a period where no events occur. This is due, in part, to the fact that a particular system
vulnerability can be exploited until it is fixed, allowing several events to occur in a short
time period. Once fixed, the system is secure again until a new vulnerability is found and
exploited. Figure A-9 shows that an IA strategy resulting in No Change to
Confidentiality receives a value of 0.5. The categories are linear on either side of No
Change since AFTAC values a gain in confidentiality as much as they dislike a loss in
confidentiality of a similar magnitude.
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Figure A-9: Change in Confidentiality Resulting from an IA Strategy
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Integrity; Protection from unauthorized change.
Rationale: Information in the system must be
dependable. It is important that the data in the system
be correct in the sense that it is what the originator
intended. Integrity addresses the concept that
information stored in a database Monday will be the
same when accessed on Wednesday. The reasons
information could become corrupted are varied; however, whether intentional or
unintentional, system integrity must protect against the entire array of possibilities.
Measure: Like Confidentiality, Integrity is also measured as a change from the existing
system. Figure A-10 shows that any decrease to current system integrity causes that
particular IA strategy to receive a severe value penalty on this measure. Any strategy that
either does not affect integrity or increases integrity will score relatively high compared
to those that decrease system integrity. The graph therefore shows that a decrease to
system integrity has a greater value loss than the gain in value for an increase in system
integrity. No Change to system integrity received the score of 0.5.
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Figure A-10: Change in System Integrity from an IA Strategy
Compliance: Measures taken to protect against
known vulnerabilities
Rationale; It is advantageous to an organization to
know exactly what security measures have been
taken to combat known vulnerabilities. Air Force
mandated security programs and policies, such as
virus software and AFCERT patches, should be
updated regularly to assure the system remains
current in its security procedures. It is the duty and
responsibility of each agency to comply with Air Force regulations.
Measure: Compliance is measured with two separate functions: the percentage of
automated compliance procedures and the percentage of validated compliance.
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Percentage of Automated Compliance Procedures:
This measure captures the ability of the system to

Information and IS Protection

automatically update and install compliance

Availability

programs. Automated compliance procedures are

Confidentiality

advantageous to an organization because they do not
require support personnel involvement. This allows

Integrity

Compliance

procedures to be installed immediately and correctly,

% Automated Compliance
Procedures

in addition to allowing support personnel the ability to
concentrate their efforts in other important matters.
The function is linear because it was determined that there is equal value gained for every
percentage increase in automated compliance procedures.

Figure A-ll: Percentage of Automated Compliance Procedures
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Percentage of Validated Compliance: It is important
Information and IS Protection

to know exactly what percentage of compliance

: Availability

procedures an organization has installed. Failure to
install these procedures could lead to an unnecessary

iConfidentiality

information compromise. This measure is shaped as
an S-curve with a sharp upward trend at 75% because
Automated Compliance
Procedures

AFTAC experts feel that a system with less than this
percentage of validated compliance provides little

% Validated Compliance

value to system protection. At 90% the curve flattens,
meaning that increasing the percentage of validated compliance above this level results in
smaller marginal value gains to system protection.
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Figure A-12: Percentage of Validated Compliance

The next sub-hierarchy under Information Assurance is Detection. Figure A-13
shows the complete Detection sub-hierarchy.
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Figure A-13: Detection
Detection: The ability of the system or system personnel to detect an event. Again, an
event is any abnormal activity or action that could compromise the system or information
contained within the system.
Rationale: The system's ability to quickly and accurately detect an event is valued
because an event cannot be stopped unless it is first detected. Detection is further
decomposed into Timely, Accountability, and Flexibility. Detection can occur from
either system personnel or the system itself. Detection capabilities must also have the
ability to be increased or decreased depending on the INFOCON situation (reference
Chapter 2). To measure this ability, Flexibility is included under Detection.
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Information Assurance
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Physical
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Figure A-14: Timely

Timely: The amount of time it takes to detect an event. The amount of time is measured
from the actual start of the event (which may or may not be immediately known) to the
point of detection.
Rationale: If an event can continue undetected for an extended period of time (extended
being relative to the system and the type of event), then that event has a greater
opportunity to cause harm than an event that was detected immediately. Since different
events may take a different amount of time to detect or pose a different type of threat,
Timely was separated into Physical Internal, Electronic Internal, Physical External, and
Electronic External. An internal event is any event caused by a person authorized to use
or work around sensitive information. An intrusion by a janitor who steals information
while cleaning after hours would therefore be classified as an internal event since he was
authorized to be around valuable information, although he would not have been approved
to access it. An authorized user is a person who is trusted to view, edit, or otherwise
manipulate the information; having access to a facility, like the janitor in the above
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example, does not necessarily mean that person is authorized to use a system in the
facility. An external event is any event caused by personnel outside of the AFATC
organization that harms the system or system information. Again, an event does not have
to be malicious; a construction crew that is working outside the AFTAC building and
accidentally cuts an AFTAC phone line would be classified as an external event.
Physical events are situations where physical property is damaged, while electronic
events are strictly performed through computer
networks.

Detection

Physical Internal: A physical disruption of the
information or IS by a person within the organization.

Timely

Physical Internal

This could be either accidental (spilling coffee on a

v^" Time to Detect PhysicaT~~N
^--■^__ Internal Event
'

keyboard causing the system to short) or intentional

Electronic Inteiiiaif

(breaking the lobby keypad to obtain access to a

Physical External

restricted area).

Electronic External

Rationale: Measures must be taken to prevent

Accountability

internal physical events, whether intentional or

Flexibility

accidental, that could result in a compromise of information. Whether the event was
malicious or not is irrelevant for this measure; it must be detected in a timely fashion so
that proper action may be taken.
Measure: The time to detect physical internal events is measured in eight-hour working
days since, in the vast majority of instances for AMIS, the event is not malicious and
valuable information is not lost or stolen. There is a steep drop after five working days
since AFTAC personnel view one workweek as sufficient time to detect a physical
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internal event. There is still some value in detecting the event prior to ten working days,
but the curve flattens out rapidly. At twenty workdays (one work month), AFTAC
personnel feel that more than sufficient time had passed since the event actually occurred,
and detecting it beyond this point, while necessary, does not score any value.

Figure A-15: Time to Detect a Physical Internal Event, measured in eight-hour workdays

Electronic Internal: An electronic event

Detection

originated from an internal source, whether

Timely

intentional (purposely trying to login to a system

Physical Internal

above the user's classification) or unintentional
Electronic Internal

(accidentally accessing a restricted site) that

'

Time to Detect Electronic
Internal Event

Physical External

could compromise information.

riectroniL PMeinal

Accountability

Flexibility
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Rationale; A tremendous amount of information can be compromised, lost, or stolen
depending on the type of electronic event that may occur. It is therefore necessary to
detect these types of events as quickly as possible.
Measure: Since Electronic Internal events originate from a "friendly source," who are
assumed to be responsible and dedicated employees, this value is measured in eight-hour
workdays. Air Force personnel are trusted to make the right decisions regarding sensitive
information, and therefore they are not continuously monitored. However, since the
opportunity exists to lose sensitive information quickly, electronic internal events must be
detected more rapidly than physical internal events. There is a fairly steep curve from
immediate detection to one day since there is great value in the ability to detect this type
of event as close to the time that it occurred as possible. The curve flattens after one day
but up until a week (5 days is one workweek) because there is still high value in detecting
an event rapidly. After one week, the curve is essentially linear meaning that each day is
as important as the next, scoring nothing at 10 or more workdays.
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Figure A-16: Time to Detect an Electronic Internal Event, measured in eight-hour workdays
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. n

10

Physical External: Any physical event affecting the information or IS by an outside
individual.
Rationale: An external physical event is defined as any
event originating from persons outside the AFTAC

Detection

Timely

organization that harms AFTAC property. It is

Physical Internal

irrelevant, in terms of the measure of detection, if the

Electronic Internal

event was malicious in nature or not. A construction

Physical External
Time to Detect Physical
External Event

crew who accidentally cut the phone line outside the

1 Icctronic Fxternal

building or a group posing as a construction crew who
Accountability ;

maliciously destroyed the line both cause the same
Flexibility

initial damage and therefore requires the same timely
detection.
Measure: The time to detect a physical external event is measured in hours due to the
fact that any event originating from an outside source is deemed to be of much higher
potential threat than an event originating within AFTAC. A physical event could cause
any number of problems for AFTAC, ranging from loss of communication to damaged
computers, or even damage to personnel in the most extreme cases. It is therefore
necessary to detect these types of events as close to their actual occurrence as possible.
The graph illustrates this point by showing that approximately half the value is lost after
only one hour, three quarters of the value is lost at two hours, and no value at all is earned
if the system or system personnel cannot detect the event within one work day (eight
hours).
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Figure A-17: Time to Detect Physical External Event, measured in hours

Electronic External: An electronic event originating
Detection

from an external source that could compromise
Timely

information, harm the system, or be otherwise disruptive
Physical Internal

to the mission.

Electronic Internal

Rationale: Any attempt to gain access, destroy, or

Physical External

otherwise compromise the system from an outside source

Electronic External

must be detected as quickly as possible to eliminate the

E^

Time to Detect Electronic
External Event

possibility of an attacker gaining valuable information or,
Accountability

worse, going unnoticed. Electronic external events are
the most dangerous events from an information assurance
point of view because they are hard to detect, they are often malicious attempts to
damage or steal AFTAC information, and they can happen very rapidly.
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Measure; Electronic external events are measured in minutes because of the extreme
threat they pose to a system. Like physical external events, there is a tremendous loss in
value if the event cannot be detected immediately; after only 10 minutes the system will
receive a score of 0.5 and by the one-hour point less than a score of 0.1 is assigned. If the
system cannot detect an electronic external event within two hours, then it is seen as
totally unacceptable and gains no value.

Figure A-18: Time to Detect a Electronic Internal Event, measured in minutes
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Figure A-19: Accountability

Accountability: The ability of the system to detect and correctly classify events.
Rationale: Accountability is composed of two sublevels that are classified separately
because they carry different levels of importance. An event must first be detected as an
event and then categorized properly. Failure to do either of these could result in an event
(1) going unnoticed, or (2) thinking an event was one
type of activity when in reality it was another and
Detection

thus resulting in an improper reaction. A system
Timely

cannot be fully accountable if it does not perform
Physical Internal

both of these values proficiently.
Electronic Internal

Ability to Detect an Event: The ability of the system
Physical External

or system personnel to determine if an event occurred.
Electronic Lxtcnul

Rationale: An event must first be detected in order to
determine if it was malicious, what information was

147

compromised, and who was responsible. If the event is not detected then valuable
information may be compromised for an indefinite period of time.
Measure; Since the detection rate (percentage of events detected) is impossible to
calculate (the system and system personnel may never know of events they did not
detect), the assumption is made that a fully automated detection system will be more
effective than a fully manual detection system. For example, a system that has the ability
to automatically detect unauthorized user intrusions is more valuable than one that
requires support personnel to periodically check log files for abnormalities. The graph
shows that a system with 100% automated detection capabilities receives a score of 1.0,
and a system relying completely on human detection (0% automated detection
capabilities) will receive a 0.0. It is assumed that a system with 25% automated detection
capabilities has 75% manual detection capabilities. The fractions represent the
percentage of total time spent on detecting events; therefore 50% automated and 50%
manual would mean that machines and personnel would spend the same amount of time
detecting events. The line between the two endpoints is slightly convex showing that
AFTAC prefers more automated systems to more manual systems.
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Figure A-20: Ability to Detect an Event, measured by Percentage of Automated Detection Capabilities

Ability to Accurately Categorize an Event: The ability
Detection

of the system or system personnel to categorize an event
Timely

correctly.
Physical Internal

Rationale: If the event was not categorized correctly,
1 lectronic Internal

then reaction to the event may be improper. An over
Physical External

reaction (i.e. "pulling the plug") may impact mission
Electronic External

capability and therefore is extremely undesirable, while
an under reaction (or perhaps no reaction) may result in
permanently lost or damaged information, an even worse
outcome.
Measure: The identical categories were used for this measure as were used in the Ability
to Detect an Event measure for the same rationale. Automated systems can categorize
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more events in a shorter period of time than humans. For example, a machine can read
through system logs much faster than a person can, so it would be expected that a
machine could categorize more errors in the logs than a human could. The shape of the
curve is similar to that of the Ability to Detect an Event, showing that the jump from 75%
automated to greater than 75% automation is valued more than any other jump of the
same distance.

Figure A-21: Ability to Categorize an Event, measured by the means of detection
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Flexibility: The ability of the system to increase or

Detection

decrease detection capabilities depending on the situation
Timely

at hand.
Physical Internal

Rationale: It would be advantageous for a system to have
Electronic Internal

the capability to increase or decrease its detection
Physical External

capabilities based on the current INFOCON level. For
Electronic External

example, at INFOCON ALPHA, the detection capabilities
Accountability

of the system might operate at normal. If the organization
Flexibility

should then go to INFOCON BRAVO, it would be
/^"'isSystem Flexible?

beneficial to have the ability to adjust detection capabilities
in order to reach higher detection fidelity. This would allow the system and system
personnel to detect more events in a high threat environment than it would in a low threat
environment.
Measure: This measure is a simple yes / no because the system either has the capability
to increase or decrease detection capabilities or it does not. An inflexible system would
be a system that could only be on or off, whereas a flexible system would have the ability
to turn certain functions on or off, or change the level of detection at which certain
services function. For example, a system that could shut down e-mail while keeping the
print server active would be a flexible system. A system which could be set to stop more
suspicious traffic according to INFOCON levels would be valued. At a low threat level,
the number of false positives could be kept low. In a higher threat setting, requiring
greater vigilance, the system would regularly have a higher false positive level, which is
acceptable in high threat situation but not acceptable for normal operations.
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Figure A-22: System Flexibility
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Figure A-23: Reaction

Reaction: Measures taken to (1) appropriately respond to an identified attack and (2)
restore the information and IS capabilities to an acceptable state, their original state, or an
improved state. Reaction also includes the ability to learn from previous events so that
the likelihood of future damage is reduced or eliminated for that type of event.
Rationale: The third step in assuring information is to properly react to an event. If there
is no action taken once an event has occurred, then the event could continue indefinitely.
Reaction involves three separate values: the ability to Respond to the event, Restore the
information, and Adapt to the new situation. Again, the Reaction sub-hierarchy is not
meant to be a timeline; Respond, Restore, and React are values that were developed
based on joint doctrine and the opinion of AFTAC personnel because they are considered
important elements of information assurance.
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Figure A-24: Respond

Respond: The ability to take proper action after an event is detected
Rationale: Once an event is detected, failure to take proper action could allow the event
to continue, cause other events to occur, or possibly ruin a chance to prosecute an
attacker. It should be noted that AFTAC is not authorized to launch any offensive
actions; however they must report the incident to a higher authority who may then take
appropriate action, as they deem necessary. AFTAC does have a responsibility to take
defensive actions to assure its information and information systems. In addition, they
also have a responsibility to collect appropriate information during an event to aid
AFTAC and others in taking authorized steps in response to the event. Respond is
therefore broken down into Timely, Flexible Deterrence, and Verify.
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Timely; The time needed to notify appropriate
Reaction

personnel after detecting an event, identifying
Respond

the event source, and then taking the proper
Timely

action against the event.
Time to Notify
Support Personnel

Rationale: It is essential to know exactly who

Time to Identify
Event

is responsible for an event and what damage

CTime to Take
*N
Appropriate Action^.^

the event caused. Notifying system personnel

Hexible Deterrence

and identifying the parties involved in a timely

Verify

fashion makes personnel aware that a certain

Restore

group or individual may be trying to access

Adapt / Learn

unauthorized information.
Measure: The time it takes to correctly respond to an event. This measure is broken into
three separate parts: Time to Notify Support Personnel, Time to Identify the Event, and
the Time Needed to Take Appropriate Action.
Time to Notify Support Personnel: The time it takes
from the discovery of an event until support personnel

Reaction

Respond

can be notified. The most desired occurrence is that

Timely

the proper support personnel are instantaneously and

Time to Notify
Support Personnel

directly notified; for instance proper personnel are

Time to Identify
Event
Time to Take
Appropriate Action.

immediately paged as soon as the system detects an

Mexible Deterrence

event. The next best category is that they are
Verify.

instantaneously but indirectly notified, an example
Restore

Adapt; J urn
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being that support personnel receive an e-mail alert at the same time the system detects
an event. The final three categories are notification by support personnel (they discover
the event and are therefore notified upon discovery), a user detecting the event (not
valued as much since the user must then notify the support personnel), and finally the
worst being no notification whatsoever.
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Figure A-25: Time to Notify Support Personnel
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Instantaneous
Direct

Time to Correctly Identify an Event: Measured
from the time support personnel have been
notified until the time they correctly determine the
nature of the event. Any correct identification
after two hours, while necessary, is deemed too
slow to be valued.

0.5

1

1.5

Time to Correctly Identify an Event (hours)

Figure A-26: Time to Correctly Identify an Event, measured in hours
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Time to Take Appropriate Action: Measured from the
time the event was correctly identified until the situation
is under control of system personnel (control implies

Reaction

Respond

Timely

either stopping the event, containing the event, or
intentionally prolonging the event to gather evidence). If
the time to take proper action is sixty minutes or more, a
score of zero will be given

MiAiblc Deterrence

Verity

Restore

; Adapt / Learn

Figure A-27: Time to Take Proper Action, measured in minutes
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Flexible Deterrence: Taking appropriate action at the
Reaction

appropriate time.
Respond

Rationale: Almost any event can be stopped by
Timely

completely shutting down the system. However, this

Flexible Deterrence

may not always be the best course of action since (1)

Point at Which Event
can be Isolated

essential missions will be impacted, and (2) it may
Verify

prevent the collection of evidence necessary for future
Restore

prosecution. The ability to have graceful degradation,
Adapt / Learn

where the system can be taken down in steps rather
than all at once, is therefore necessary to take proper action.
Measure: This measure is separated into categories that classify the system's ability to
be shut down at different levels. The preferred outcome is a system that will disconnect
from the network only at the source of an event, causing minimal disruption to the rest of
the system and its users. The worst case is that during any event, the entire system must
be shut down. High value is still gained if the event can be isolated at the service level,
for instance the system administrators can shut down the print service if an event is
detected within that server. Very low value is given if the entire server must be taken
down in order to isolate an event since it will now be unavailable to all who need to use
it.
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Verify: The ability of the system or system
administrators to determine, after the event, if their
actions, which include detecting, classifying, and
gathering evidence from an event, were appropriate.
Rationale: Decisions must be made quickly during
an event. After the event is over, it is therefore
necessary to determine if the decisions made were

id Personnel Detect,
Identify, and Act
Properly?

the correct decisions. For instance, after responding
to an attack, the system administrators would like to
have the ability to go back to system logs and see if enough information about the event
was retained. If, after careful review, it was thought that a better action could have been
taken, a different course of action or procedure may be necessary if a similar event
occurred in the future.
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Measure: After further review of the response process, did AFTAC personnel identify,
categorize, and act properly given the nature of the event. The measure is a binary Yes or
No, with Yes receiving a value of 1.0 and No receiving a value of 0.0. There is no
middle value in Verify because it was felt that when the organization reflects upon its
actions, they either detected the event, categorized it, and reacted to it correctly or they
did not. Therefore personnel must accomplish all three tasks in order to receive a score
of 1.0.
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Figure A-30: Restore

Restore: The ability to restore information or an information system to an acceptable
level after an event.
Rationale: Information must be restored to an acceptable state after an event. Both time
and accuracy are considered when determining if the restoration was successful. The
idea of graceful restoration, where systems can be brought back step by step instead of in
an all or nothing fashion, is key in determining the
restoration capabilities of a system.
Timely: The amount of time needed to recover and
restore information to an acceptable level.
Rationale: Failure to restore information in a
timely manner could result in permanently lost
information, prolonged vulnerability, or decreased
mission capability.

162

Measure: Amount of time needed to restore mission capabilities. This measure is
separated into two parts: the amount of time to restore full infrastructure and the amount
of time to restore data. The amount of time to restore full infrastructure is measured in
hours, and the amount of time to restore data is measured in days, as it often takes much
longer. In addition, some missions can be accomplished when the infrastructure is
restored but not all databases have been restored and verified as accurate.
Time to Restore Full Infrastructure: The amount of
time needed to fully restore the system to its original
capability. The faster full infrastructure can be
restored the more valued it is to the organization. The
curve is steeper from 0 to 2 hours because of the
importance of restoring the system in under two hours.
No value is gained for restoring the system after 6
hours.
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Figure A-31: Amount of time to restore full infrastructure, measured in hours

Time to Restore Data: The amount of time needed to retrieve and restore lost or
damaged data to the system. This process often takes a
Reaction

longer period of time then infrastructure restoration
i\_ p. I J

since it involves the process of determining what data
I imdy

was lost, finding the last instant when the data was not
»AMlAl.rri.nLL

corrupt, and restoring the system with the uncorrupted

Verily

data.
Restore

Timely
CTime toi Restore Full
Infra
Infrastructure
Time to Restore Data
;

: Accurately i

Adapt/Learn
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Figure A-32: Time to Restore Data, measured in days

Accurately: The information restored must be
Reaction

correct.
Respond

Rationale: Restoration of incorrect information is not
Timely

acceptable and therefore has no value to the unit.
Flexible Deterrence.

Measure: The percent of data accurately recovered.
Verify

Again, inaccurate recovered data has no value, so
Restore

only the percent of correct data recovered is
lundy

considered. No value is given unless at least 20% of
the lost data can be recovered. The curve rises
gradually to 80% and then becomes steeper because
there is little value to the unit if they cannot recover
all or almost all of the lost data.
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Figure A-33: Percentage of Data Accurately Recovered

Adapt / Learn: The ability of the system or system
users to learn from an event and adapt to the new

Reaction

Respond

situations resulting from the event.
Rationale; Learning from mistakes or events and

Timely

taking corrective action prevents the same errors from

Flexible Deterrence

occurring multiple times.

Verify

Measure: This measure was separated into two parts:

Restore

the ability of support personnel to teach the system, and

Timely

the ability of the system to teach itself. The reason for

Accurately:

the separation is that it is beneficial to allow personnel
to manipulate system algorithms when necessary. The
most desired characteristic is that the system can teach

Adapt / Learn
Ability of Support Personnel
to Teach System
Ability of System to
Teach Itself

itself. When the two functions are combined, the best possible case is a system that will
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adapt automatically, but will allow an administrator to teach it different procedures when
needed. The worst case is a system that is completely unchangeable, meaning that it does
not learn from past vulnerabilities and cannot be programmed to deal with them in the
future. Each separate function must be weighted to determine if the ability of support
personnel to teach the system is more important than the ability of the system to teach
itself, or vice versa.

Cannot be Taught

Partially Taught

Fully Taught

Ability of Support Personnel to Teach System

Figure A-34: Ability of Support Personnel to Teach the System
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Impact of IA on System Operational Capability
Changes to information assurance are likely to impact system operational
capability and therefore they must be considered in the study. The complete Impact of IA
to System OC hierarchy is shown in Figure A-36.
Impact of IA on System
Operational Capability
(IOC)

1
Efficiency

Functionality

Convenience

Ease of Implementation

Flexibility

Ability to Process
Users

Missions
Enabled

Accessibility

Time to Implement
and Test

Upgradability

Impact on System
Overhead

Availability

Complexity

Usage
History

Expandability

(change in down time)

Compatiblity
User

Support
Personnel

Figure A-36: Impact of Information Assurance on System Operational Capability

Impact of IA on System Capability: The amount of system operational capability (OC)
gained or lost due to implementing a new IA strategy.
Rationale: Changing the system to improve IA will almost certainly have some impact
on the system's operational capability. It is therefore necessary to consider OC when
determining what, if any, IA course of action should be implemented. A strategy that
greatly increases IA may severely reduce system operational capability and therefore may
not be the best alternative when all factors are considered. The most desired goal is to
improve IA and positively impact the system's operational capability, if possible.
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Efficiency
Impact of IA on System
Operational Capability
(IOC)

Efficiency

Functionality

Convenience

Ease of Implementation

Flexibility

Ability to Process
Users
_ Impact on System
Overhead

Figure A-37: Efficiency

Efficiency: The system can perform the required tasks quickly and consistently with
respect to demand on the system.
Rationale: Implementing an IA strategy may impact the speed of the system, which
would force it to be able to process a different amount of information per time period.
This value is broken down into the Ability to Process Users and the Impact on System
Overhead.
Ability to Process Users: The impact an IA strategy

Efficiency

will have on the system speed and usage with respect
Ability to Process Users

to the system users (not support personnel).

Change in User Throughput

Rationale: If the system is slower because of a new

Impact on System Overhead

IA strategy, then the users may experience slower
service when trying to access information. This may cause the mission to suffer since
users cannot perform their jobs at the same speed as before. Likewise, an increase in user
service due to an IA strategy will allow users to do their missions faster and perhaps more
effectively.
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Like many measures in the Impact of IA to System OC hierarchy, this measure
focuses on the change the IA strategy will have on OC. In this case, No Change is valued
greater than 0.5 because most IA strategies actually decrease OC. When a strategy does
not materially adversely impact the system OC, then it will usually receive a fairly high
value.
Measure; The Ability to Process Users is measured by the Change in User Throughput to
the system. User Throughput is defined to be the speed at which the system allows the
user to work. For this measure, increasing user throughput at all will gain a value of
0.85. Again, this is due to the fact that any increase in OC from an IA strategy is a
welcome bonus.
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Figure A-38: Ability to Process Users, measured as the Change in User Throughput
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Impact on System Overhead: The percent capacity of the system an IA strategy
requires.
Rationale: The less an IA strategy negatively

Efficiency

impacts system capacity the better the strategy will

Ability to Process Users

be (all other things being equal). A system running

Impact on System Overhead

at 80% capacity will be less effective then a system

Change in System Capacity

running at 50% capacity assuming both can do all jobs equally. Increasing a two-lane
highway into a four-lane highway will increase the capacity of the road, thereby making
its ability to process automobiles more efficient (more cars can now use the highway then
before). Likewise, an IA strategy that allows more information to be processed will
increase the system capacity, and therefore the system operational capability.
Measure: Impact on System Overhead is measured by the change in system capacity due
to an IA strategy. Again, no change to the current system is seen as a good alternative,
scoring a 0.6. Increasing system capacity scores a 0.85, but decreasing capacity scores a
0.2.
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Figure A-39: The Impact on System Overhead, measured as the Change in System Capacity
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Functionality
Impact of IA on System
Operational Capability
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(change in down time)
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Figure A-40: Functionality
Functionality: The usefulness offered to system clients by providing information and
information related capabilities (both desired and essential)
Rationale: A change is the system usefulness (in relation to the mission or the users) will
affect system functionality. For example, if a new IA strategy allows the system to
perform a new function, then the overall usefulness of the system increased. Likewise, if
a strategy now forces the system to be down 50% or more of the time than it used to be,
the system has lost functionality because its users cannot access the system. This value
was separated into Missions Enabled, Availability, and Compatibility.
Missions Enabled: Did the new IA strategy
Functionality

allow the system to perform any new missions or
Missions Enabled

functions?

'

Rationale: It was determined through discussion
that no IA strategy that removed a mission would
ever be considered for implementation on the
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•/-—GidStrategy Enable a New
~N
^~^_
Mission?
_-^

AMiilabihty

Compatibility

target system. Therefore only the ability to add new missions or functions to an existing
system will be considered.
Measure: The measure is simply determining if the new IA strategy enabled the system
to perform more missions or functions than it previously could.

Figure A-40: Missions Enabled, measured as the Ability of the IA Strategy to Enable New Missions
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Availability: The change in downtime due to an
Functionality

IA strategy.
Missions Enabled

Rationale: A system that is down too much will
decrease mission performance. If an IA strategy

Availability
hange in System Availability

causes the system to be down five times a week

Compatibility

(compared to say three times before the new
strategy), then the system has lost availability and thus functionality.
Measure: The Change in System Availability is used to measure how the new IA
strategy affects previous system availability. Availability is crucial to mission
accomplishment, thus No Change scores a 0.9. Figure A-41 shows that while increasing
availability might be nice, decreasing availability, even slightly, is simply unacceptable.
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Figure A-41: Availability, measured as the Change in System Availability due to
implementing a new IA strategy
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Compatibility; The ability of the information
system to interact with other systems, hardware, and

Functionality

software.

Missions Enabled

Rationale: Increasing or decreasing the amount of

Availability

systems that are compatible with the current

Compatibility

configuration could impact the usefulness of the

egree of Difficulty in Making
Strategy Compatible

information system. It was determined through
discussion that an IA strategy that was truly incompatible would never be considered for
implementation.
Measure: The Degree of Difficulty in Making a New IA Strategy Compatible is used to
measure how well an IA strategy interacts with other systems. AFTAC experts agreed
that almost any IA strategy can be made compatible; however some take a considerable
amount of effort and some do not. The categories range from complex, where system
experts spend many days working the strategy into the existing system, to strategies that
involve no difficulty whatsoever, such as changing a software package from version 2.0
to version 2.5.
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Figure A-42: Compatibility, measured as the Difficulty in Making New IA strategies
Compatible with existing system configurations
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Convenience
Impact of IA on System
Operational Capability
(IOC)

X

I

Efficiency

Functionality

1
Convenience

Ease of Implementation

Flexibility

Accessibility

Complexity
User

Support
Personnel

Figure A-43: Convenience

Convenience: The level of complexity needed to operate the system
Rationale: Changing the difficulty in using the system could impact how well the user is
able to process information, thereby affecting system operational capabilities. A user is
likely to avoid very inconvenient systems if the mission can be accomplished elsewhere
or it is non-essential. The system exists to serve the users, minimize their difficulty, and
provide secure, assured access to important information. Since Convenience captures the
ability to access the system, and once in the system, the ability to use it, Convenience is
separated into Accessibility and Complexity.
Accessibility: The change in system accessibility

Convenience

faced by the user due to an IA strategy.
Accessibility

Rationale: Changing the user's ability to gain
access to the system could cause the user to waste

Change in System
Accessibility

Complexity

valuable mission time just trying to logon to the
system. Likewise, a user may be able to gain access more quickly due to an IA strategy,
such as using a smart card.
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Measure: Accessibility is measured by the Change in System Accessibility. This graph
contains more categories than previous graphs because of the sensitivity of system
accessibility; very small changes can have a large impact on the ability of a person to use
the system. A score of No Change gains the strategy a score of 0.5, meaning that this is a
neutral position. The magnitude of value difference on either side of No Change is the
same regardless of whether accessibility was increased or decreased.
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Figure A-44: Accessibility, measured as the Change in System Accessibility
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Figure A-45: Complexity

Complexity: The level of difficulty in using the system, both for users and support
personnel.
Rationale: The longer it takes to train and become proficient in a system, the less time
that person has for performing their mission. Since this differs for users and support
personnel, they are treated separately. AFTAC support personnel feel that the systems
are there to help the users perform the mission, and support personnel must ensure the
systems are useable. Therefore it was deemed by support personnel in the study that it
was far better to have a system that is easy for users to work, yet difficult for support
personnel to maintain, than it would be if the
situation were reversed.

Convenience

Users: The complexity of training and using the
system on the user end.

! Accessibility

Complexiiv

Users
Change in System
Complexity for Users

■ Support Personnel
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Measure; Again, this value is measured relative to the original system. Not changing the
degree of difficulty in using the system scores a 0.5. Making a system more complex to
the users will cause a loss in value while making it less complex for users results in a gain
in value.

Significant Moderate
Increase Increase

Minimal
Increase

No
Change

Minimal Moderate Significant
Decrease Decrease Decrease

Change in System Complexity for Users

Figure A-46: User Complexity, measured as the Change in System Complexity for Users

Support Personnel: Complexity of training
Convenience

and using the system for support personnel.
ÄC^ÖplJi»

Support personnel are defined as any person
Complexity

responsible for system upkeep.

Users

Measure: This value is measured using the
same categories that were used for the Degree

Support Personnel
\j>
Change in SysterriN.
^^ Complexity for Support )
^--^_ Personnel _^^-^

in Change in User Complexity. However,

from the graph it is apparent that support personnel do not score as great a loss in value
score for increasing complexity as the user graph did. As mentioned above, this is due to
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the fact that support personnel are willing to use a complex system themselves in order to
prevent users from working on a more complex system. Support personnel do value the
ability of an IA strategy to decrease complexity. The No Change category actually scores
higher in this graph (0.6) than it did in the previous graph (0.5) because the support
personnel in the study feel that there is better than average value to any strategy that does
not make their job harder.
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Figure A-47: Support Personnel Complexity, measured as the Change in
System Complexity for Support Personnel
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Figure A-48: Ease of Implementation
Ease of Implementation; The degree of difficulty associated with installing a new IA
strategy
Rationale; An IA strategy that is very difficult to implement may impact system OC due
to time, training, and testing. Ease of Implementation was separated into the Time to
Implement and Test and Usage history.
Time to Implement and Test; The time
needed to implement and test an IA strategy.
Rationale: It is important to implement and

Ease of Implementation

Time to Implement and Test

test an IA strategy in a timely fashion.
Measure: This value is separated into three
categories: the time it takes to implement

Usage History

software strategies, hardware strategies, and
physical strategies. This separation was used because of the relative time to implement is
valued differently for each type of strategy. For example, if what is believed to be a
simple software upgrade ends up taking all day to install, then it would receive no value.
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However, a physical information assurance measure that can be implemented in less than
one workday would receive a score of almost 1.0.
Software: The Time to Implement and Test
Software strategies is measured in hours

Ease of Implementation

since these types of installations usually

Time to Implement and Test

occur within one workday. The graph shows
that there is a significant value drop after
three hours. After four hours, the curve
Usage History

becomes even steeper, and anything over six
hours is seen as a significant burden and receives no value.
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Figure A-49: Time to Implement and Test a Software IA Strategy, measured in hours
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Hardware: Hardware implementations typically

Ease of Implementation

take longer to accomplish than software
Time to Implement and Test

installations, thus it is measured in workdays.
Very high value is given for installations that
take less than half a day. After a half-day, the
curve is steep to one-day implementation time.

Usage History

After one day, the curve is somewhat linear with a few minor slope adjustments until it
reaches the value endpoint of six workdays.

Figure A-50: Time to Implement and Test a Hardware IA Strategy, measured in workdays
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Physical: Physical IA strategies tend to take
Ease of Implementation

even longer than hardware implementations, and
Time to Implement and Test

therefore physical implementations are
measured in workweeks. If the task can be
accomplished in under a week then at least 80%
of the value will be earned. Tasking taking four

Usage History

weeks (about one months' time) or more receive
no value for this measure. Many physical strategies inconvenience users and support
personnel due to construction, crowded office space, deliveries, and so forth. Therefore
the value drop from week to week increases until the third work week, where almost all
value is lost.

Figure A-51: Time to Implement and Test a Physical IA Strategy, measured in workweeks

187

Usage History: The track record of a hardware or

Ease of Implementation

software IA strategy; i.e. how the product fared in
1 ime to Implement and Test

the past, particularly on similar systems.
Usage History

Rationale: It was considered better to use
hardware or software that has been proven to be
operationally effective compared to items that are absolutely brand new and may have
errors that might not yet have been discovered. There is some trade-off between using
state of the art but untested products and highly reliable products that have been
previously tested.
Measure: This measure was separated into two parts: the history of the strategy across
industry and the unit personnel's experience with that strategy. While a strategy might be
common practice in industry, if no one in the office had ever used it before then it might
not be the best alternative for the organization. On the other hand, if a strategy is not the
industry standard but AFTAC personnel have a depth of experience with it, the strategy
would be favored in the second measure although not the first. Industry usage and unit
experience are both valued.
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Industry History: This measure is capturing how
well the product has fared in similar situations
over time. An industry standard is a product that
is widely used and widely accepted by similar
organizations and / or information systems. This
also means that help is readily available from
outside sources should AFTAC need it. No Exposure means that the strategy is unique to
the organization; there is no one else outside the organization that uses or has used the
product.
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Figure A-52: Product Usage History, measured as the Amount of Exposure
the Product has Seen in Similar Industries
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Personnel Experience: A product's usefulness is
limited if personnel at the organization have
limited experience or would require numerous
hours of training in order to be proficient with the
product. Therefore, all other things being equal,
an organization would want strategies for which
its people already have expertise using. These categories are organization wide, and not
necessarily the level of expertise of the highest individual. Therefore it would depend on
the organization and specific strategy being considered to determine the overall personnel
expertise. One person within the organization who is experienced in a strategy is better
than none, but it is preferred to have wide experience throughout the organization.
1
0.8
a,

p.55-

0.6

3

>

0.4

"ISP

0.2

No Experience

Minimal
Expierience

Moderate
Expieriance

High Experience

Amount of Experience Personnel Have with IA Strategy

Figure A-53: Personnel Usage History, measured as the Amount of
Experience Personnel have with the Product
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Figure A-54: Flexibility

Flexibility: The ability of the system to change over time as technology evolves.
Rationale: It is important that systems can be upgraded or expanded when new
technology becomes available or the opportunity to improve the system exists. This
value category is separated into Upgradeability and Expandability.
Upgradeability: The ability of the system to
Flexibility

allow software or hardware upgrades. An
upgrade involves enhancing an old product with

Upgradeability
'

/^ Can System beN
v.^_ Upgraded?
'

v

a technologically superior one.
Rationale: Upgrades to the hardware or software

Expandability

due to an IA strategy may improve system performance, thereby increasing OC. It is
important to note the difference between upgradeable and replaceable; almost any system
can be entirely replaced once a superior one is available. An upgradeable system is one
where components of the system may be changed without having to replace the entire
system. For example, installing a new operating system, which also has better protection
for office personal computers, would be considered a software upgrade.
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Measure: After much discussion, it was determined that a strategy is either upgradeable
or not, and that there is no degree to upgradeability. If a system is upgradeable, then IA
experts begin to ask other questions such as whether or not it is compatible, easy to use,
and so forth. System expertise will be a key consideration in the scoring of this measure.
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Figure A-55: Upgradeability, measured as whether or not the system can be upgraded

Expandability: The ability of the system to
Flexibility

accept additional components. The difference
Upgradeability

between expandability and upgradeability is that
Expandability

expandability considers only adding similar
'

components to a system architecture.

f
Can System be""^
^—__ Expanded?
'

Rationale: A system that has the ability to expand can become more powerful without
too much disruption to the system. For example, a system configuration which allows
new hard drives to be easily added is more valuable then a system that needs to be
completely re-configured to install the drives.
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Measure; Like Upgradeability, Expandability is a binary category. A system or strategy
is either expandable or it is not. Again, if the system is expandable, other qualities may
be pursued, but the degree of expandability is not a factor.
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Figure A-56: Expandability, measured as whether or not the system can be expanded
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Impact of IA on Resource Costs
The final sub-hierarchy, the Impact of IA on Resource Costs (IRC), is shown in
Figure A-57:
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£

1

Time

Number

Figure A-57: Impact of Information Assurance on Resource Costs

Impact of IA on Resource Costs: The impact an IA strategy will have on both
workforce and fiscal costs.
Rationale: All other things being equal, the system that consumes the least amount of
AFTAC resources will be the more desired system.
Life Cycle Acquisition Costs: The fiscal cost of
an IA strategy.
Rationale: Budget constraints and monetary
resources force cost to be a consideration when
determining an IA strategy.
Measure: There are two separate costs to consider when dealing with an IA strategy: the
initial cost to purchase the product, and the maintenance costs it will consume over a
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period of time. Initial costs were separated into computer systems and physical systems
since they are treated differently by Air Force regulations.
Initial Computer System Cost: Air Force
regulations require that any computer system

Initial Computer
System Cost

purchase over $ 100,000 must be approved by

|—^""waiPhyäcaT
Construction Cos.
Average
gecurrihg Costs,

the Air Force. Therefore, any purchase under

$100,000 receives a very high value since it can be executed within AFTAC. In addition,
purchases under $100,000 can be done more rapidly than larger purchases due to the
approval process. Once the $100,000 threshold is crossed, there is a severe drop in value.
Any computer system strategy that requires an initial investment of over $1 million
scores as no value on this measure.
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Figure A-58: Initial Life Cycle Acquisition Cost for a Computer System, measured in millions of dollars
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Initial Physical Construction Cost: The curve
Life Cycle Acquisition Costs

for initial dollar cost for physical construction is
shaped the same as it is for computer systems,

—(

Initial Computer
System Cost,

|—^"v^\ pnysicaT
Construction Cos

although the dollar breakpoints are different.

1

f
Average
"*'" secHfUgil§§|sj

Air Force regulations state that any physical construction under $500,000 does not need
to be authorized outside the agency; however once that point is crossed Air Force
authorization is required. Such authorization requires more time to attain and is thus less
valuable to AFTAC. Therefore, if a physical IA strategy can be accomplished for under
$500,000, it will receive high value score (over 0.9). Any physical construction over $5
million will receive no value.

Figure A-59: Initial Life Cycle Acquisition Cost for Physical Construction, measured in millions of dollars
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Average Recurring Costs: Regardless of the
type of strategy, recurring costs are considered
equally. This graph shows that every dollar is

Initial Computer

|—/^\n,tta\ Physical
Average
Jecurring Costs

considered to be as valuable as the next,

resulting in a linear relationship from $0 to $200,000. Every dollar that can be saved is
valuable to AFTAC. After $200,000/yr, no value is earned on this measure.
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Figure A-60: Recurring Cost of an IA strategy, measured as the Normalized Unit Annual Cost per Year
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Figure A-61: Personnel

Personnel: The workforce cost of an IA strategy.
Rationale: Implementing an IA strategy may impact the ability of people to perform the
mission. Since users and support personnel have separate costs associated with them
(user time learning IA is considered different then support personnel time because it takes
away the user from the actual mission), they are treated separately in the hierarchy.
User: The amount of user time needed to learn an
IA Strategy

Personnel

Rationale: The more time a user spends training as
a result of a new IA strategy, the less time they will

User
'

-/^urne Needed to ""N
^^JTrain Users^_^s

Support Personnel

have to perform their primary mission

Measure: User training time is measured in hours because user time is highly valued.
Taking people away from their primary job in order to train them in IA means that they
are not performing their mission during this time. Ideally, all user training should be
accomplished within a half-hour. After an hour there is a severe value drop. After four
hours, no value is scored.
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Figure A-62: Time Needed to Train Users, measured in hours

Support Personnel; The amount of added
Personnel

training and people needed to support an IA
User

strategy, broken down further into time and
Support Personnel

number.
Time

Time: The amount of time needed to train

Initial Time Needed tf>
Train Support
Personnel

support personnel in an IA strategy.
Rationale: Support personnel will not be able
to perform their mission while they are actively
training in an IA strategy.

Measure: The Time Needed to Train Support Personnel is composed of the initial
training period and recurring training over the course of the year.
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Initial Time Needed to Train Support
Personnel: Initial training is considered to be

Personnel

the initial exposure ofthat person to the new

User

strategy. Since the support personnel need to

Support Personnel

be experts in the strategy, several workdays

Time

training is not uncommon. There is a steep

Initial Time Needed To"»
Train Support
Personnel

drop in value after four workdays, however,

Frequency of Support^
IfPgrsonnel Training.
Time per Training
Session

because this is the point at which the training
Number

has severely taken the administrator away from
their primary mission. Lengthy Temporary Duty (TDY) assignments are therefore not
desirable. There is another drop after five workdays. After twenty workdays, or about
one months' time in training, there is no value to be gained. Every time support
personnel must attend training, they force the rest of the organization to function without
them. When they are gone for long blocks of time, this can cause a heavy burden on the
remaining personnel and users.
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Figure A-63: Time Needed to Initially Train Support Personnel in an IA strategy, measured in workdays

Recurring: The degree of training that
support personnel must attend per IA strategy

Personnel

over the course of the year. It is composed of

User

both how often the training occurs

Support Personnel

(frequency), and how long the training lasts

Time
'Initial Time Needed!
Train Support
Personnel^,

per session.

Frequency of SupporT"
^Personnel Training

Frequency: How often the training occurs

Time per Training""
Session __

over the course of the year.
Number

Measure: This value is measured by how
often support personnel are taken away from regular duties to train in an IA strategy.
Both Daily and Weekly score a 0.0 since this is considered to be too much of a burden on
the person and the unit. A strategy that requires recurring training once per year or less
often will receive the maximum value of 1.0.

201

1
:

0.9
0.8
0.7

,

ISÄfflii»

Wmmwmßm

mm

fitll

m

0.6
3

0.5

0.5

«MI

> 0.4
0.3

rO^

0.2
0.1
0
Weekly

Monthly

Yearly

Quarterly

Frequency of Support Personnel Training

Figure A-64: Frequency of Training Needed for Support Personnel

Time per Training Session: Independent of
Personnel

the frequency of training is the time per training
User

session. Each day is considered valuable,
Support Personnel

supporting a steep drop off after every full day.
Time

Recurring training that lasts over three

Initial Time Needed tö"*Train Support
Personnel^

workdays receives a score of 0.0. Recall that

^Frequency of Support""
Personnel Training

this is measuring recurring training in strategies

Time per Training
Session

■—HH

that personnel are already considered to be
experts.
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Figure A-65: Time Needed per Training Period for Support Personnel, measured in workdays

Number; The change, either positive or

Personnel

negative, in the number of people needed to
User

perform an IA strategy.
Support Personnel

Rationale: All things being equal, an IA
Time

strategy that requires one support person will be

Äliilflil
Number

a better strategy than one that requires two. It is

% Increase or Decreased
Support Personnel Needed

unlikely that an organization will be able to

for IA

request personnel be moved (either into or out of the organization) depending on their
current IA situation; however, it is possible that some support personnel will have the
ability to perform other duties should an IA strategy free up some of their time.
Measure; This value is measured as the Percent Change in the Number of Support
Personnel required after a new IA strategy. This graph is very sensitive to change, since
a loss or gain of 10% is a considerable amount of people. The graph exhibits a steeper
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value change for adding personnel than for freeing up personnel. As previously
mentioned, this is due to the belief that it would be difficult to add personnel.
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Figure A-66: Percent Change in Support Personnel Needed due to implementing a new IA strategy
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